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Since the late 1980s, almost all Latin American countries have gone through a 
process of far-reaching economic reforms, featuring in particular trade, financial and 
capital account liberalization. Contrary to expectations the reforms have failed to give 
economic growth a major boost. At the same time, income inequality has risen in a 
context where inequality was already very high to begin with. Not surprisingly, little 
progress has been made on poverty reduction since 1990. Indeed poverty has been 
rising in the region as growth slowed down after 1995. 
An important and natural question to ask is whether the reforms are the reason 
or at least a significant contributing factor in the poor performance of the region since 
the mid 1990s? Did they contribute to the growth slowdown and the rise in poverty 
and inequality? These are crucial questions the more so, because the countries in the 
region are considering further trade integration under the flag of the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) and the regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
subscribing to further trade liberalization. Key players from the region, like Brazil, 
were instrumental in blocking a new global trade agreement under WTO aegis in Sep-
tember 2003 precisely because of concerns about the developmental and equity effects 
of freer world trade. 
In this paper we apply a rigorous comparative analysis of the impact of trade 
reforms on growth, employment and poverty.
1 We use computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models for sixteen countries in the region, covering over 90% of 
its population and of its GDP. We also develop a micro simulation model to translate 
the macroeconomic, sector and labor market impacts analyzed through the CGE 
model into changes in poverty and inequality. 
Our short answer to the main questions posed above is that trade liberalization 
and the switch to export-led growth are not the cause of the growth slowdown in the 
region.  Nor are they the cause of rising poverty and inequality.  On the contrary for 
most countries their impact is mildly positive for both growth and poverty reduction.  
But overall, the impact of the reforms or of export growth while positive, are small. 
Trade  reforms  increase  the  skill-intensity  in  labor  demand  distributing  the  gains  
                                                 
1 Rob Vos (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague), Enrique Ganuza (UNDP, New York), Samuel 
Morley (IFPRI, Washington D.C.), Sherman Robinson (IFPRI, Washington D.C.), Valeria Pineiro 
(IFPRI, Washington D.C.). 
   unevenly. Some social groups win (mostly the better-educated workers and profit 
earners) and some lose (often agricultural and unskilled workers) in the process 
providing the explanation towards rising inequality observed in most country 
experiences. So while the trade reforms are not to blame for the region’s woes, they 
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 1  WHO GAINS FROM TRADE LIBERALIZATION? 
More than a decade ago, most Latin American countries introduced far-
reaching trade and other economic reforms. Greater openness to global commodity 
and financial markets was expected to bring more welfare and efficiency gains which 
would make the economies more resilient to withstand external shocks. The initial 
signs looked promising. In many parts of the region economic growth recovered 
strongly in the early 1990s. Inflation rates were slashed and in many instances real 
wages recovered. These trends could not be sustained in the second half of the 1990s. 
Growth slowed down on average and became more volatile. Many countries in the 
region, including Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, suffered 
shorter and longer-lasting economic setbacks. Much of the renewed economic 
insecurity has been associated with volatile global financial markets. The Latin 
American countries seemed to be riding high on the surge of capital flows to the 
region in the early 1990s, but collapsed following sudden stops in access to external 
finance later in the decade. Unemployment and poverty rates moved down and up 
again with the macroeconomic cycle. At the same time, trade liberalization and a new 
wave of regional integration agreements stimulated export growth around the region 
and – as this study shows – exports have become the engine of growth in most 
countries of the region. 
There are good reasons to doubt whether the type of export-led growth Latin 
America is embarking on is yielding the expected welfare gains. Export growth 
clearly has not been enough to compensate for shocks elsewhere in the economy. 
Employment growth, if any, has been disappointing. There is also evidence and 
concern over rising inequality in labor markets (see below and Morley 2001, Ganuza 
et al. 2001, Vos et al. 2002, and IDB 2002), which makes it more difficult for 
aggregate gains in growth to translate commensurately into lower poverty. There is 
not just the financial market instability. Overall, trade reforms seem to have brought 
little diversification of exports. Reliance on primary commodity exports has remained, 
on average, at least as heavy as before the trade reforms. Deteriorating terms of trade 
explain much of widening current account deficits. Modest productivity increases 
have been achieved, but also at a loss of the capacity to generate jobs and the deeper 
integration into the global market has increased the demand for more educated 
workers, typically short in supply, to the detriment of less educated workers, typically 
abundant in supply. Generation of a more pro-poor growth process has not been 
1    
helped this way. An old and central concern of Latin American development has re-
merged: the relative abundance of natural resources seems to continue to determine 
much of the pace of the economy and vulnerability to terms-of-trade shocks, while 
poor endowment of human capital appears to hamper a transition towards a more 
equitable growth path. Many see the shades of Raúl Prebisch. 
Should Latin American governments be advised to consider a return to 
protectionist policies, alike they did after the world depression of the 1930s? It seems 
out of place in this day and age and the above sketched picture may be much too 
aggregate. Several countries did manage to diversify exports, create substantial 
amounts of new jobs and reduce poverty along the way. Chile’s natural resource 
endowment seems to have functioned more as a blessing than a curse and has 
dynamized many non-traditional natural resource-based export activities. Mexico, 
most countries in Central America and the Caribbean developed fast-growing and 
labor-intensive  maquila industries, non-traditional agriculture, long-distance 
(teleservices) and/or tourist sectors. One aspect these cases have in common that trade 
reform went beyond import liberalization and included a wide range of active export-
promotion measures. It raises the question as to what importance to attach to open 
trade policies and further (regional) trade integration? How much of shifts in income 
distribution and poverty can be attributed to trade reform? These are crucial questions 
the more so, because the countries in the region are considering further trade 
integration under the flag of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), bilateral 
free trade treaties with the US and/or in the context of regional economic integration 
areas such as Mercosur, the Andean Pact, Central America’s free trade area (CAFTA) 
and the North-American free trade area (NAFTA). The countries of the region also 
have become WTO members, subscribing to further trade liberalization, including 
elimination of export subsidies. Key players from the region, like Brazil, were 
instrumental in blocking a new global trade agreement under WTO aegis in 
September 2003 precisely because of concerns about the developmental and equity 
effects of freer world trade. 
To what extent are such concerns justified? Are the trade reforms indeed to 
blame for the regions woes? Would further trade integration be more harmful than 
beneficial in terms of growth and poverty reduction? And, under what conditions 
would the countries of the region, or developing countries in general, be in a better 
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position to reap the potential benefits of globalization? These are central issues raised 
in this paper. 
Trade reforms have economy-wide effects requiring a general equilibrium 
approach in order to be able to assess the full impact of such reforms. In this paper we 
use a standardized Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to compare the 
impact of trade reforms (and external shocks) on relative prices, sectoral output and 
employment, household income and consumption and their interactions. The model 
framework allows us to isolate the impact of specific policies and external shocks. 
Country-specific Social Accounting Matrices were constructed defining the economic 
structure of each country case and the accounting framework for each country model. 
For poverty and income distribution analysis, a drawback of the typical CGE model is 
that income distribution is captured as between-group differentials for relatively 
aggregate labor categories and household groups. This makes it difficult to get at the 
impact of, say, trade reforms on poverty, since we need the full distribution. To 
overcome this, we apply a ‘top down’ multiple modeling framework with the CGE 
model as the first layer and a methodology of micro simulations as the second layer. 
The latter translates the general equilibrium effects of trade reform on the labor 
market onto household incomes allowing one to derive an estimate of the impact on 
poverty and inequality of macroeconomic changes making use of the full income 
distribution from micro (household survey) data. 
Section 2 details the methodology and underlying assumptions of this 
approach and thereby also its limitations. Section 3 describes the main findings of the 
CGE simulations. In order to make the analysis as comparable as possible, we have 
standardized the simulations imposed on each country model as well as the so-called 
‘closure rules’ of the models which define the macroeconomic adjustment of the 
corresponding economies and the nature of the labor market. This way, differences in 
simulation results per country are reduced to differences in economic structure and 
capacity to respond to relative price changes. Subsequently, we compare the results of 
this exercise in ‘elasticity structuralism with the simulation results obtained from the 
country models with the nature of macroeconomic and labor market adjustment 
defined specifically for each economy by the country authors. Section 4 reports on the 
poverty and inequality outcomes as obtained from the application of the micro 
simulation approach. In section 5 we conclude, that trade liberalization, as isolated 
from other policies and factors of influence, appears to have a poverty-reducing effect 
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in most of the Latin American economies. The same applies for multilateral trade 
scenarios, like the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the worldwide adaptation of 
WTO rules. Poverty reduction from further trade reform is rather small however, such 
that the present analysis leads us to conclude that export-led growth stimulated this 
way is no panacea and does not suffice to give the region the economic shot in the 
arm it needs to lift itself from poverty and do away with its deeply rooted inequality. 
 
 
2  CGE MODEL STRATEGY 
The country studies in this project have all used a common economy-wide, 
multi-sector modelling framework: a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 
The model is a ‘standard’ CGE model described in detail in Löfgren, Harris, and 
Robinson (2002).
2 Such models are used extensively in policy analysis, and provide a 
framework for capturing linkages between economy-wide changes or shocks; the 
sectoral structures of production, trade, and employment; and distributional outcomes. 
A CGE model captures the circular flow of income in an economy, as shown in figure 
1. The circular flow framework and models based on it are closed in the sense that the 
framework accounts for all flows of goods and services across markets, the 
corresponding flows of payments, and all other transfers among agents. All economic 
transactions in the economy are captured, and the accounts of each agent in the model 
must balance. 
 
2.1  Social Accounting Matrix 
The accounts of the various agents, and much of the underlying data for a 
CGE model, can conveniently be summarized in the form of a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM)—see figure 2. A SAM  is  a square  matrix  that,  for  a period of  time 
(typically a year), accounts for the economy-wide circular flow of incomes and 
payments. Each entry represents a payment by a column account to a row account. 
Since the income-expenditure accounts of each agent must balance, the corresponding 
row and column accounts in the SAM must also balance exactly. Although SAMs are 
most commonly constructed for countries, they may be applied at widely different 
                                                 
2 The model is in the family of trade-focused CGE models developed by Dervis, de Melo, and 
Robinson (1982) and Robinson et al. (1999). The model is implemented in the GAMS modeling 
language. The description below draws on the monograph by Löfgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002).  
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levels of aggregation: households, villages, regions, countries, and the entire world. A 
SAM summarizes the structure of an economy, including its internal and external 
links, and the roles of different actors and sectors. A national SAM brings disparate 
data (including input-output tables, household surveys, producer surveys, trade 
statistics, national accounts data, balance of payments statistics, and government 
budget information) into a unified framework, and provides the underlying conceptual 
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The ‘agents’ in a CGE model based on the SAM in figure 2 include producers, factors 
of production, households, enterprises, government, savings-investment, and the rest 
of the world. The aggregate ‘savings-investment’ account collects savings and 
purchases capital goods—a macro agent that essentially represents the financial 
system and the loanable funds market. The SAM is a compact way to present the 
national accounts, and nicely traces out the circular flow from production activities to 
factor payments to incomes of ‘institutions’ and back to demand for commodities. 
The SAM incorporates the three macro balances: government deficit, trade 
deficit, and savings-investment balance. The macro balances are expressed as flows – 
the SAM does not include asset accounts – and any macro relationship in this 
framework will be in flow terms. All models in the SAM framework must ‘explain’ 
how balance is achieved in the three macro accounts. Given that the SAM is always 
balanced, determining two of the macro balances necessarily determines the third. The 
SAM represents a closed system – all economic transactions are included – and 
models in this framework will incorporate Walras’ Law in some form. They need 
(indeed, only can) explain one less than the total number of accounts in the SAM. 
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FIGURE 2 
National SAM used in the CGE model 
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2.2  The ‘Standard’ CGE model
3
Producers (‘activities’ in the SAM) and consumers interact across product and 
factor markets, buying and selling goods and services. Producers are assumed to 
maximize profits, purchasing inputs and selling outputs in competitive markets, 
constrained by their production technology. In the model, production functions 
include intermediate inputs according to fixed input-output coefficients and primary 
factors (capital, labor, and land) according to constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
functions (see Appendices table A.1, equations 11-15). Households receive factor 
income (wages and profits) from producers, pay taxes, save, and spend the rest to 
consume goods and services (‘commodities’ in the SAM). Households are assumed to 
maximize utility, and their demand for commodities is given by the linear expenditure 
system (LES) (see table A.1, equations 33-34).  
A CGE model is Walrasian in spirit, incorporating all the flows in the SAM, 
including production, distribution, and demand; and determining equilibrium wages 
and prices by simulating the operation of all markets. The model is an empirical 
special case of the neoclassical Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. The model 
can only determine relative prices, and some price or price index is chosen as 
numéraire—the consumer price index in the models used in this project. The absolute 
price level is undetermined and must be specified exogenously. The supply and 
demand equations in the model are all homogeneous of degree zero in prices – double 
all prices and equilibrium production and demand do not change – so the absolute 
price level does not matter to the real side. In macro terminology, the model displays 
strong neutrality of money. Introducing some mechanism to determine the absolute 
level of prices such as a simple transactions demand for money plus a fixed money 
supply would determine the absolute price level, but would not affect relative prices 
or any real magnitudes.  
Typically, classic CGE models specify fixed supplies of primary factors of 
production (e.g., labor and capital) and assume that all markets ‘clear’ in that prices 
and wages (defined broadly to include rental rates for all factors) adjust to achieve 
supply-demand equilibrium in all product and factor markets. In macro terms, the 
model will always generate full employment of all factors and hence the economy is 
always operating on the production possibility frontier. Many applications of CGE 
                                                 
3  See Appendices  table A.1 for a formal description of the model. 
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models focus on introducing various distortions to the price system and calculating 
the resulting inefficiencies and loss of welfare. Assuming full employment, however, 
‘inefficiency’ is always in terms of being at the wrong place on the production 
possibility frontier, not from ending up at some point inside the frontier.  
To capture the characteristics of labor markets in developing countries, it is 
common to specify an alternative treatment of the labor market. Instead of a fixed 
labor supply, some labor categories are assumed to be available in unlimited supplies 
at a fixed real wage. This treatment is consistent with the dual economy models of 
Lewis and Ranis and Fei, and has been used in most of the country models in this 
project.
4 In this specification, any changes in the economic environment that would 
normally lead to a rise in the real wage will instead lead to an increase in employment 
and aggregate GDP. 
 
2.2.1  Imports, exports, and the balance of trade 
Extending the classic Walrasian CGE model to incorporate foreign trade was a 
major part of the work program in the development of CGE models. The specification 
in the standard model follows what has become a broad consensus for ‘trade focused’ 
CGE models and incorporates imperfect substitutability between domestically 
produced and traded goods, citing early work on specifying import demand functions 
by Paul Armington.
5 The Armington insight is extended to the treatment of exports, 
and the model specifies import demand based on sectoral CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) ‘import aggregation’ functions and export supply based on sectoral CET 
(constant elasticity of transformation) ‘export transformation’ functions (see 
respectively equations 24 and 21 of Appendices table A.1). This model is an extension 
of the Salter-Swan model and is a theoretically consistent generalization of the 
‘standard’ trade model with non-traded goods, introducing degrees of substitutability 
and transformability rather than assuming a rigid dichotomy between tradable and 
non-tradable goods. The theoretical properties of this model have been worked out in 
detail.
6
                                                 
4 See Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961).  
5 Armington (1969).  
6 See, for example, Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982); de Melo and Robinson (1989); Devarajan, 
Lewis, and Robinson (1990, 1993); de Melo and Tarr (1992); and Thierfelder and Robinson (2002).  
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Adding exports, imports, and the trade balance also raises the issue of how the 
receipt-expenditure account of the new actor, the world, is brought into balance, or 
equilibrated. As with the Salter-Swan model, trade-focused CGE models include a 
new equilibrating variable, the real exchange rate, which is the relative price of 
aggregates of traded and non-traded goods. There is an implicit functional relationship 
between the real exchange rate and the trade balance. Increasing foreign savings 
always yields an appreciation of the real exchange rate—the price of non-traded 
goods rises relative to the price of traded goods (exports and imports).
7 Exports fall as 
producers shift production toward domestic markets and imports rise as consumers 
shift demand in favor of imports, bringing the trade balance into equilibrium with the 
new exogenous higher level of foreign savings.  
Most, trade-focused CGE models, and the standard model, introduce the 
exchange rate as an explicit variable, with units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency. However, the ‘currency’ is not money but simply defines the units 
of domestic and world prices—domestic prices in local currency units and world 
prices in foreign currency units (e.g. dollars). The model still contains no assets or 
money, and the exchange rate is not a ‘financial’ variable in any sense. Changes in the 
exchange rate work only by changing the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods 
on domestic markets, affecting export supply and import demand. 
 
2.2.2  Savings, investment, and government 
In addition to the trade balance, CGE models applied to actual economies 
incorporate savings and the demand for investment goods. The introduction of the S-I 
account, which collects savings and purchases investment goods, is standard. A new 
flow equilibrium condition is added to the model – the flow of savings must be made 
to equal the flow demand for investment goods – and some mechanism is introduced 
to achieve savings-investment balance (see equation 45 of Appendices table A.1). 
Typically, CGE models specify fixed savings rates by households and assume that 
whatever is saved is then spent on investment goods. The result is a ‘savings-driven’ 
model of aggregate investment demand.
8
                                                 
7 The theoretical properties of the real exchange rate in this model are worked out in Devarajan, Lewis, 
and Robinson (1993).  
8 This is an example of a macro ‘closure’ of the CGE model. Other examples will be discussed below.  
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The government in a classic CGE model collects taxes, makes and receives 
transfer payments, and purchases goods and services. It is hard to see the government 
as being a utility maximizing actor; so most CGE models treat government as 
following specified rules of behavior.
9 For example, a common specification is that 
government expenditure is fixed in real terms, including transfers; government 
revenue is determined by fixed tax rates; and government savings is determined 
residually as the gap between revenue and expenditure. The model treats the 
government deficit or surplus as coming from the loanable funds market, and so any 
government deficit ‘crowds out’ private investment.  
The discussion above has described a typical CGE model that achieves macro 
balances (or macro ‘closure’) in a particular way, which can be termed ‘neoclassical 
macro closure.’ The model assumes full employment, with wages and prices adjusting 
to achieve equilibrium in factor and product markets. The balance of trade is fixed 
exogenously, which determines foreign savings. The real exchange adjusts to achieve 
the specified trade balance through its affect on aggregate imports and exports. The 
government has a simple rule-based specification: fixed real expenditure, fixed tax 
rates, and government savings determined residually. Households and firms have 
fixed savings rates, which determine private savings. Finally, given that all the 
components of savings are determined by various rules and behavioral parameters, 
aggregate investment is specified as ‘savings driven’ and equal to the sum of private, 
government, and foreign savings. 
 
2.2.3 Macro  closure 
There is a large literature on issues of macro closure of CGE models.
10 The 
issue is how the model achieves flow equilibrium in the three macro balances: 
savings-investment, government deficit, and the balance of trade. Since the model 
satisfies Walras’ Law, the macro closure issue is to specify equilibrating mechanisms 
for achieving balance in two of the three accounts—the third account will then 
necessarily balance as well. 
                                                 
9 There are exceptions in the public finance literature where government is treated as analogous to a 
household, with its own utility function. See Shoven and Whalley (1992). 
10 See, for example, Sen (1963), Taylor (1983, 1990), Rattsø (1982), Robinson (1989, 1991), and 
Dewatripont and Michel (1987). For a recent discussion of macro closure issues in CGE models, see 
Robinson (2003).  
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The standard model offers a number of different choices of macro closure. For 
the trade balance, one can either assume that the trade balance is fixed and the real 
exchange rate adjusts to equilibrate aggregate exports and imports or that the real 
exchange rate is fixed and the trade balance is endogenous. For savings-investment 
balance, one can assume that the model is ‘savings-driven’ as discussed, above with 
fixed savings rates for various actors determining aggregate savings, which in turn 
determines investment. Alternatively, one can assume that aggregate investment is 
either fixed or set by some macro relationship and that the savings rate of some actor 
or actors adjusts to generate the savings required to finance aggregate investment—
the model is ‘investment-driven’. Similarly, government expenditure can either be 
assumed to be fixed or set by some macro relationship, and that government savings is 
determined residually as the difference between government earnings and 
expenditure. Alternatively, one can assume that government savings is fixed and that 
some tax instruments are determined endogenously to generate the needed funds.  
In general, both the extreme savings-driven or investment-driven macro 
closures seem unrealistic, forcing all macro adjustment in either aggregate savings or 
aggregate investment. Looking at the historical experience of countries undergoing 
macro shocks and structural adjustment programs, a specification of some kind of 
‘balanced’ macro closure seems more realistic, spreading the macro adjustment 
burden evenly among aggregate investment, consumption, and government 
expenditure. Specification of such a balanced closure is an option in the standard 
model, and was used in about a quarter of the country studies in the project.  
 
2.2.4  ‘Labor market closures’
These various macro closures can be linked to different specifications of the 
operation of factor markets to generate a rich menu of possible macro-employment 
interactions. The essential issue is that the classic Walrasian CGE model, in which all 
markets clear, yields a full-employment equilibrium and market-clearing prices and 
wages, while short-run macro models typically involve wage and price rigidities, 
partial adjustment mechanisms, and equilibrium without market clearing, including 
unemployment. The two paradigms embody very different notions of equilibrium.
11 If 
                                                 
11 Malinvaud (1977) discusses the different notions of ‘equilibrium’ in macro and general equilibrium 
models.  
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the CGE model assumes factor markets clear, then any choice of macro closure will 
have no effect on aggregate employment and little or no effect on aggregate GDP. In 
this situation, different macro closures will have ‘compositional’ effects – the balance 
between aggregate investment, consumption, government spending, and the trade 
balance – but no effect on the level of real economic activity and employment. 
There is a literature on ‘structuralist’ CGE models, which embody elements of 
short-run macro models, including ‘demand-driven’ Keynesian models that yield 
equilibria with unemployment.
12 These models do not explicitly incorporate financial 
variables and asset markets, but manage to work within the flow-equilibrium structure 
of CGE models. They effectively impose a macro story onto the CGE model structure 
that involves the assumption that labor markets do not clear and that macro shocks 
can have effects on aggregate employment and GDP. Most structuralist models start 
from the assumption that the labor market does not clear with flexible wages, but is 
limited it its adjustment. In a Keynesian structuralist model, the labor market is driven 
by macro phenomena, and employment is affected by aggregate demand via a 
Keynesian multiplier process. In such a model, the real wage is viewed as a macro-
equilibrating variable, with employment determined only by the demand for labor.
13  
Most of the country studies in this project specify a combination of 
structuralist features in the labor market and Keynesian multipliers. The comparative 
analysis described in section 3, define a set of ‘standardized’ closure rules for all 
countries, using a ‘balanced’ macroeconomic closure, i.e. with weak Keynesian 
demand adjustment, and a fixed real wage in all sectors assuming an unlimited supply 
of labor at that wage. The implication, as described above, is that any change that 
would normally lead to an increase in the real wage (e.g., increased productivity or 
capital stock growth) will instead lead to an increase in the demand for labor and 
higher aggregate employment. 
                                                 
12 See Taylor (1983, 1990).  
13 The multiplier process works through changes in the real wage. An increase in final demand (e.g., 
investment or government demand) requires an increase in savings, which requires an increase in in-
come, which requires an increase in output, which requires an increase in employment, which requires 
a decrease in the real wage (since firms are assumed to be on their demand curves for labor). 
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2.3  Macro-micro linkages: economy-wide shocks, distribution, and poverty 
A major focus of the analysis is to translate changes at the macro or economy- 
wide level to resulting impacts on the distribution of income and poverty. The 
methodological issue we need to tackle is how to track the mechanisms by which 
economy-wide shocks involving macro variables work their way through the 
economy, finally affecting household livelihoods. Figure 3 provides a schematic 
picture of the mechanisms involved. 
The ‘top-down’ causal chain works from macro shocks through the operation 
of factor and product markets yielding prices, wages, and employment, and finally to 
household income and expenditure. A crucial part of analyzing and modelling 
distributional outcomes at the household level, is the specification of the various 
sources of income at the household level and how those sources are linked to the 
operation of factor and product markets. In terms of the SAM data framework and 
SAM-based analysis, it is crucial to disaggregate the factor markets, including data on 
the ownership of factors by households. In various settings, it may be important to 
disaggregate production and employment by categories such as region, sector, skill 
category, gender, age, and nature of employment (e.g., self employed, informal sector, 
or formal sector), all of which could be relevant in determining how households earn 
their income. In addition, the extent to which households operate in commercial or 
formal markets can be important—for example, home consumption can represent a 
significant part of real income and consumption for poor farmers. 
The analysis is ‘top down’ in that the goal was to translate from economy-
wide changes to outcomes at the household level. No attempt was made to determine 
feedbacks from changes at the household level back through the operation of factor 
markets to macro variables.
14 A major advantage of the top-down approach is that the 
analysis and modelling of households, based on survey data, can be done separately 
from the economy-wide analysis, and there is no need to reconcile the household data 
with the national data. The communication between the two strands is in the form of 
information  about  changes  in  prices,  wages, and employment — there is no need to 
                                                 
14 To the extent the CGE differentiates various groups of households, it does account for the feedback 
effects of changes in their relative incomes and consumption levels on the rest of the economy through 
differences in spending behavior across those household groups. 
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reconcile data on levels.
15 The micro simulation analysis at the household level is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.4  Micro simulation methodology 
The country analyses in this study focus on the labor market as the main 
transmission channel of the modelled impact of trade reforms on poverty and 
                                                 
15 Such an integrated analysis requires a modelling framework that can accommodate many 
households, using the household survey data. It is not necessary to model all the households in a 
sample survey. For a discussion of the use of ‘representative’ households in models, see Löfgren, 
Robinson, and El-Said (2003). 
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distribution. To go from the counterfactual labor market effects simulated with the 
CGE model to poverty and income distribution at the household level we need to deal 
with two methodological issues. First, how to incorporate both between and within 
group effects into the distribution analysis? That is, how can we account for the full 
distribution and thus for the heterogeneity of the population within households when 
assessing the poverty and inequality effects? Second, people may change position in 
the labor market (hence also affecting household income) due to trade reforms, 
external shocks or other simulated macro changes. Workers may shift from one sector 
to another, change occupation or lose their job. The methodological issue is to find a 
procedure that can account for such labor market shifts and identify which individuals 
are most likely to shift position in order to be able to simulate a new, counterfactual 
income distribution. 
Various micro simulation methodologies have been proposed in the literature 
to deal with these problems.
16 We mention two types that try to answer the type of 
questions raised in this study. The first involves the estimation of a microeconomic, 
partial equilibrium household income generation model through a system of equations 
that determine occupational choice, returns to labor and human capital, consumer 
prices, and other household (individual) income components (see for instance, 
Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand 2001, Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig 2001). 
Combining this methodology in ‘top-down’ fashion with a CGE model has been 
probed by Bourguignon, Robilliard, and Robinson (2002) for the case of Indonesia. 
A second micro simulation approach of less modelling intensity assumes that 
occupational shifts may be proxied by a random selection procedure within a 
segmented labor market structure. This procedure allows one to impose counterfactual 
changes in key labor market parameters (participation rate, unemployment, 
employment composition by sectors, wage structure, etc.) on a given distribution 
derived from household survey data and estimate the impact of each change on 
poverty and income distribution at the household level.  This type of methodology of 
counterfactual micro simulations originated with Orcutt (1957) for tax incidence 
analysis in developed countries and Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) for between-
                                                 
16 See Bourguignon, Pereira da Silva and Stern (2002) for an overview of related methods. It should be 
noted that the approach is fairly new in its application to developing country context, but that 
combinations of macro or CGE policy models and micro simulations, for instance to assess 
distributional effects of tax reforms, are quite common in applications in developed countries. 
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group differentials in mean earnings and, more recently, with Almeida dos Reis and 
Paes de Barros (1991) for an analysis of inequality in the full distribution of 
earnings.
17 The latter approach was subsequently generalized to analyze total per 
capita household income inequality and poverty (see Paes de Barros and Leite 1998; 
Paes de Barros 1999; Frenkel and González 2000; and Ganuza, Paes de Barros and 
Vos 2002). 
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where nh is the size of household h, yphi the labor income of member i of household h, 
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In equation (2), yqphi = individual non-labor income of member i of household h and 
yqth = other household incomes. In the simulations yphi is altered for some individuals 
i of household h as a result of changes in the labor market parameters.  
The second micro simulation approach as applied in Ganuza, Barros and Vos 
(2002) is followed in most country studies and defines the labor market structure in 
terms of rates of economic participation (Pj) and unemployment (Uj) among different 
groups j of the population at working age defined according to sex and skill, the 
structure of employment (defined according to sector of activity S and occupational 
category O) and remuneration W1, as well as overall level of remuneration W2. The 
skill composition of the population is represented by variable M. The labor market 
structure can be written as π = π(P,U,S,O,W1,W2,M).  
For all types of individuals, the unemployment rates determine part of the 
labor market structure. The latter is further determined by the structure of 
employment. The employed workforce is classified according to segment k, defined 
                                                 
17  It should be noted that both Orcutt and Oaxaca-Blinder essentially involve accounting methods as-
suming fixed positions of workers and household groups. For a recent overview of applications of mi-
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on the basis of sector of activity and occupational category. For both skill groups 
within segments k in the labor market, the average remuneration is calculated and 
these averages are expressed as a ratio of the overall average. The effect of alteration 
of parameters of the labor market structure on poverty and inequality can now be 
analyzed using the accounting identities of equations (1) and (2). The impact of 
changes in the labor market can be analyzed both separately and sequentially. 
The Ganuza-Barros-Vos approach introduces a number of important 
assumptions about the labor market. First, as indicated, for lack of a full model of the 
labor market, a randomized process is applied to simulate the effects of changes in the 
labor market structure. That is, random numbers are used to determine: which persons 
at working age change their labor force status; who will change occupational 
category; which employed persons obtain a different level of education; and how are 
new mean labor incomes assigned to individuals in the sample. Hence, the assumption 
is that, on average, the effect of the random changes correctly reflects the impact of 
the actual changes in the labor market.
18 Because of the introduction of a process of 
random assignation, the microsimulations are repeated a large number of times in 
Monte Carlo fashion.
19 This allows constructing 95% confidence intervals for the 
indices of inequality and poverty, except in the case of the simulations of the effect of 
change in the structure and level of remuneration, which do not involve random 
numbers. In each simulation, the incidence, depth and severity of poverty and the Gini 
and Theil coefficients of the distribution of both per capita income and primary 
incomes are calculated.
20  
It should be noted that the case studies of Argentina and Mexico follow a 
hybrid approach to the micro simulations.  Rather than randomly selecting the 
individuals in the simulations as done by Ganuza et al. (2002), a probability function 
                                                                                                                                            
crosimulation approaches for assessing the impact of government policies in OECD countries, see 
Gupta and Kapur (2000). 
18 The possibility of incorporating conditional probabilities to decide which individuals change status 
within the labor force will be explored in future research.  
19 Experiments with the methodology for several household survey data sets show that about 30 
iterations are sufficient. Repeating the simulations a larger number of times does not alter the results. 
20 Mean incomes per decile are calculated in the simulations. These means are subsequently assigned to 
new employed or to already employed persons who changed sector of employment, occupational 
category or moved from one educational group to another. In principle, to assess the impact of changes 
in the labor market structure, one would have to calibrate the data base prior to simulating the effect of 
said changes – that is, replace the original labor incomes by mean incomes per decile. A test showed 
that both the direction of change and the magnitude of the effect do not change if one uses the original 
values of the labor incomes instead of calibrated values.  
  17 
is estimated to determine who, given personal characteristics, is most likely to move 
and which is the likely income he or she will obtain as a result of the shift. 
Subsequently, the estimated parameters replace the randomized procedure in the 
Ganuza et al. methodology, thereby moving closer to the first type of micro 
simulations.  In terms of figure 3, there is a closed-line arrow from labor market 
outcomes to poverty and inequality at the household level, representing the link as 
established through the Ganuza-Barros-Vos approach. The alternative 
microsimulation approach as in Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2002) would 
add a probabilistic specification of household labor supply behavior, adding an 
additio
e micro simulations are the same 
r all alternative poverty and distribution measures. 
3  IS OF 
RMS AND EXTERNAL SHOCKS 
3.1 
s are a result of both differences in economic structure and adjustment 
behavior. 
nal link as represented by the arrow with the dotted lines in figure 3. 
Below in section 4 and in the country studies we report results for the poverty 
incidence (P0) and the Gini coefficients for labor and per capita household incomes. 




MACRO CGE SIMULATIONS: COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYS
EFFECTS OF TRADE REFO
Standardized  simulations 
In this section we report the main findings of the CGE simulations for 
alternative trade reform and trade integration scenarios and a number of external 
shocks for the 16 Latin American countries in our sample. In order to make the 
outcomes as comparable as possible we ran the same simulations (with shocks of 
equal size) in two steps. First, we apply the policy shocks for a standardized set of 
‘macro’ and ‘labor-market’ closures. Second, we then compare those outcomes with 
the ‘actual’ closures as used by the country studies. Since we have a ‘standard’ model, 
imposing standardized closures implies that in the first set of simulations we focus on 
differences in outcomes of the imposed policy changes and shocks which are due to 
differences in economic structure and the capacity of markets to respond to relative 
price shifts. One could call this an exercise in ‘elasticity structuralism’ as we assume 
roughly identical behavior and functioning of the economies. The country-specific 
closures should identify how macro and labor market adjustment is working out in 
reality as justified in the country studies and differences in outcomes of the 
simulation
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The standardized closure rules involve: (a) alternatively, a fixed or endogenous 
level of foreign savings for the external balance (i.e. respectively corresponding to a 
flexible and a fixed exchange rate regime); (b) a balanced savings-investment closure 
rule (see section 2); and (c) endogenous government savings (i.e. fixed tax rates). For 
the labor market closure, we assume a fixed real wage for all labor categories, 
implying that all adjustment falls on quantities (employment), rather than prices 
(wages). 
The country-specific closures in half of the cases involve a fixed exchange rate 
regime and the other half assumed a flexible regime.
21 Most countries (except 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela) had the same government balance closure as in the 
standard simulations, but only four countries (Bolivia, El Salvador, Mexico and 
Paraguay) used a ‘balanced’ S-I closure. Two countries assumed a neo-classical 
macro closure (Peru, Brazil) and the rest (10) assumed a Keynesian, investment-
driven closure. In most cases, factor market closures assumed segmented markets with 
different adjustment mechanisms by type of factor, mostly allowing for 
unemployment in the formal and unskilled labor segments and with price (wage) 
adjustment predominating in the informal and/or skilled labor segments. The various 
closure mechanisms are summarized in Appendices table A.2. 
Given the structure of the CGE model, we expect that trade liberalization with 
flexible exchange rates will cause a real devaluation and a shift of relative prices in 
favor of tradables. If the tradable goods sector has a higher average productivity and 
labor-intensity than non-traded activities, this should lead to an expansion of 
aggregate output and employment along the lines of the dependent-economy model. If 
the exchange rate is fixed, trade liberalization will be accompanied by an inflow of 
foreign capital assuming as is generally the case that imports rise by more than 
exports. That compounds the expansionary effect of trade liberalization in the short 
run, by reduced import cost and increasing aggregate demand. Thus, if the given 
conditions hold we would expect a stronger expansionary effect of trade liberalization 
under a fixed-exchange rate regime as in this case rising domestic demand and a 
widening external balance will not hit a foreign exchange constraint. The ensuing real 
exchange rate appreciation depresses the positive impact on exports and traded-goods 
                                                 
21 The external closure in the Cuban model is slightly more complex as it assumes a dual foreign 
exchange market. The exchange rate is fixed in the official market and flexible in the informal segment. 
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output, but if trade elasticities are relatively low (which would hold in particular for 
point-sourced primary exporters, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and several 
other cases) the foreign capital impulse and expansion of non-traded goods tend to 
outweigh the effects on export production. For similar reasons, devaluations tend to 
be contractionary. Under a flexible exchange-rate regime, we allow the real exchange 
rate to depreciate to accommodate a rising trade deficit triggered by import 
liberalization and keep the level of foreign savings fixed. If all the other conditions are 
the same as indicated above, the expected result would now be a strengthening of the 
export drive and tradable goods output and employment, but more restricted aggregate 
demand growth as access to external borrowing is restricted. 
The employment effects of trade liberalization under the standard closure rules 
will depend on the labor and skill intensity of the main sectors in the economy. Recall 
that we assume (unrealistically) a fixed labor supply and fixed real wages in all 
sectors, such that all labor market adjustment falls on shifts in quantities of labor. 
Standard trade theory would predict trade liberalization to lead to rising demand for 
unskilled labor if that is the abundant factor and rising overall employment assuming 
the country will specialize in the production for which it has a comparative advantage. 
However, many of the countries in our sample may equally be defined as natural 
resource abundant and probably are less unskilled-labor abundant than competitors in 
Asia for world market production. Point-source natural resource abundant countries, 
alike those mentioned above, likely have relatively low labor intensity in export 
production and have weak or negative employment gains from trade liberalization, 
while skill-intensity may rise if the non-traded sector is high on demand for more 
educated workers. As suggested above, the latter effect may be stronger if we assume 
that the inflow of foreign capital is endogenous. These effects may differ in 
economies with  more diffuse  natural  resource endowments (i.e. more diversified 
primary exports and predominance of small holders in exports, such as coffee) and a 
basis for manufacturing exports (including maquila). Such conditions would fit 
Mexico and the Central American countries, for instance. Positive employment effects 
are likely stronger under these conditions, even though skill-intensity may still rise if 
the average level of education of workers in the mentioned activities is higher than the 
average for the rest of the economy. 
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The results for the key macroeconomic variables and employment for the 
standardized simulations are displayed in tables 1, 2 and 3. Results for simulation re-
sults for the country-specific closure rules are in table 4.   
We begin the discussion with policies such as tariff reduction, export subsi-
dies, devaluations and foreign capital inflows that are related to liberalization of trade 
and capital flows, and export promotion. Next to these scenarios of unilateral trade 
reform, we study the effects of two multilateral trade agreements: a WTO scenario of 
free trade and worldwide elimination of export subsidies and the much debated option 
of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). We then look at two exogenous trade-
related issues, namely terms of trade shock, represented here by a rise in the price of 
all imports, and the impact of an across the board increase in productivity, which is a 
quick way of exploring the effect of long term growth on poverty reduction and in-
come distribution.   
 
3.2  Macroeconomic simulations results 
3.2.1 Tariff  reduction 
In this experiment we reduce tariffs by ten percent relative to their base period 
level.  Since base levels vary significantly between countries, the absolute size of the 
impact of this trade liberalization on output, employment and poverty will also differ 
across countries. The impact of trade liberalization is unambiguously expansionary in 
every country in our sample except for Brazil. Total output and employment both 
increase and by non-trivial amounts. Exports are the engine of growth in all the 
simulations in which we fix foreign saving, and they lag behind overall growth when 
we fix the exchange rate, and in fact decline absolutely in three countries.  The 
opposite is true for fixed investment. When the exchange rate is fixed and tariffs are 
reduced, there is an increase in imports financed mainly by an increase in foreign 
saving. If foreign saving is fixed the increase in import demand has to be financed by 
an increase in exports.   That requires a real devaluation. Since an increase in foreign 
saving or an exchange rate appreciation is itself expansionary, as we will see in a 
moment, the impact of the tariff reduction on output and employment is larger in the 
fixed rate case than it is with fixed foreign saving in all but the Dominican Republic.     
All of this is relevant to understanding the history of trade liberalization in 
Latin America. With fixed foreign saving, when tariffs are reduced there is a real 
devaluation and export led growth, which is just what the advocates of trade 
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liberalization expect.  But if the exchange rate is fixed instead there is even faster 
growth but it is not led by exports. Morley and Vos (2004) point out that in many 
countries exports have not been growing very rapidly. One of the reasons for that is 
that the reduction in tariffs was accompanied by a large inflow of foreign capital. That 
inflow permitted the monetary authorities to fix the exchange rate to help control 
inflationary pressures.  Investment and consumption grew rapidly, but exports lagged 
behind. The fact that trade liberalization did not bring fast, export-led growth in Latin 
America is not merely due to a competitive failure of Latin-American export 
industries as some have claimed, since one cannot ignore the importance of the fact 
that liberalization was accompanied by a big inflow of foreign capital or equivalently 
of exchange rate appreciation. 
 
3.2.2  Devaluation and an increase in foreign saving 
Here we look at two policies, which should have opposing effects on the 
economy.  In the first experiment we devalue the nominal exchange rate by ten 
percent.  In the second we treat foreign saving as exogenous and increase it by ten 
percent of the value of exports in the base run.
22 In all countries except the Dominican 
Republic, devaluation is contractionary and an increase in foreign saving (or exchange 
rate appreciation) is expansionary.  Employment falls in the one case and rises in the 
other. 
These results may seem surprising, but one must think carefully about what 
the model is telling us. Recall that this is a comparative static result. We are asking 
what will happen if there is a permanent increase in the equilibrium inflow of foreign 
saving. This is not a temporary or one-time increase, but a permanent shock. When 
there is such an increase in equilibrium inflows, there will be an equilibrium or 
permanent increase in absorption, a real exchange rate appreciation and a shift in 
production away from traded goods. Total output and employment will both be 
higher. Similarly, in this comparative statics exercise devaluation operates as a 
permanent policy shock, lowering the level of foreign capital inflow structurally 
depressing aggregate demand and thus output and employment. 
                                                 
22 We did the experiment this way because the base-year level of foreign saving was positive in some 
countries and negative in others. 
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The model does not tell us anything about the short-run costs of adjusting to 
the change in production structure. When there is a change in relative prices, factors 
must be transferred between sectors. But that takes time, partly because it will require 
capital formation, but also because labor has to be found, hired and trained. That may 
well mean that during the adjustment process output may fall even it is going to be 
higher in the new long-run equilibrium solution. 
What lessons does all this hold for Latin America? The main one is that 
foreign saving or capital inflows far from being constant as assumed in the general 
equilibrium solution, are actually highly variable. Many countries reduced tariffs and 
enjoyed big capital inflows until the late 1990s. Output and employment increased 
just as the theory predicts that it should. But the problem was that these inflows were 
not sustainable.  When foreign exchange crises hit in Mexico in 1994, then in Russia 
and Brazil in 1998, and Argentina in 1999, these capital flows abruptly reversed. That 
forced exchange-rate devaluations in countries with a flexible regime or heavy 
domestic demand cuts in those with a fixed regime; both provoking a sharp decline in 
growth rates all over the region, again just as the theory would predict.  The lesson 
here is that if a country is liberalizing trade with variable foreign saving, it should try 
to keep its exchange rate at a level at which the level of foreign saving required in 
equilibrium is also sustainable in fact. If it is able to do that, trade liberalization will 
be expansionary. 
 
3.2.3 Export  subsidies 
In this experiment we increased export subsidies uniformly by ten percent of 
their base period level. Where the subsidies were negative, we made them ten percent 
less negative. Subsidizing exports is expansionary in every country in either closure 
(fixed or flexible exchange rates) except for Brazil in both closures and Argentina for 
the fixed exchange rate case. Not surprisingly growth is led by exports, which appear 
to be quite sensitive to this kind of subsidy in most countries of the region.  When 
foreign saving is fixed (i.e. under a flexible exchange rate), the real exchange rate 
appreciates enough to raise imports and cut back the growth of exports. When the 
exchange rate rather than foreign saving is fixed, the growth in exports is far greater 
and the growth in imports far less. But the increase in total output (while still positive 
in all but Brazil and Argentina) is smaller than it is with the subsidy and fixed foreign 
saving. In effect, there is a reduction in foreign saving and a large improvement in the 
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In this experiment we eliminated all domestic tariffs and export subsidies and 
we used a vector of the hypothetical world prices for major traded goods groups under 
a scenario worldwide enforcement of WTO regulations (See Appendices table A.3). 
The new set of world traded goods prices was generated by simulating such a scenario 
using the GTAP world model.
23 In the WTO scenario generally higher (agricultural) 
commodity prices are expected as subsidies to agricultural production in the 
developed countries would disappear, which – depending on the export structure – 
may compensate producers for the loss of export subsidies in the Latin American 
countries. Each country author applied the new price vector in accordance with the 
commodity breakdown in his or her country SAM/CGE. The world price increases 
produce a substantial positive impact to agriculture in those Latin American countries 
where agriculture is neither protected nor subsidized. 
Indeed, in most of the countries of the region (9/15) moving to full free trade 
is expansionary under either fixed or flexible exchange rates. The main exceptions 
are: Mexico and the Dominican Republic each of whom has special trading 
relationships with the United States whose value disappears under full free trade; 
Cuba, Paraguay and Venezuela who would lose protection of domestic agriculture 
without benefiting sufficiently from higher world prices; and Brazil for whom free 
trade has little effect one way or the other. For most other countries agricultural 
production rises, however, and if foreign saving is fixed, they become more open, 
with a rise in both exports and imports and a real appreciation of the exchange rate. If 
the exchange rate is fixed the overall growth is similar but the composition is 
different.  In about half of the countries there is a fall in the trade deficit (i.e. a 
reduction in foreign saving) as the growth rate of exports at higher world prices 
exceeds the effect of the fall in domestic protection. That is the case in Argentina, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay where agricultural products are 
an important component of exports. 
                                                 
23 We are grateful to E. Diaz Bonilla and X. Diao of IFPRI for generating this vector of world market 
prices. For a description of the GTAP model, see Hertel and Tsigas (1997). 
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3.2.5 FTAA 
The second multilateral trade agreement simulation is a scenario of the 
creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). As in the WTO simulation we 
used the hypothetical vector of world prices for traded goods calculated by the GTAP 
world model that would be observed if Latin America and the United States 
successfully created a hemisphere-wide free trade area. Here each of the Latin 
American countries was assumed to reduce its tariffs on trade with other countries in 
the region, which we approximated by reducing average tariffs by the proportion of 
each sector’s imports coming from other Latin American countries. 
Because the impact of this partial move toward full free trade on world 
commodity markets is far smaller than the WTO, the changes in world prices are 
much smaller. These results are based on a scenario where all tariffs between 
countries in the Western Hemisphere are eliminated, but producer subsidies are left at 
the current levels. In particular, average world agricultural prices go up by less than 
0.009% (there is an increase in the agricultural prices but a decrease in the 
manufacturing prices) rather than 5% as they do in the WTO simulation. This does not 
imply as one might expect, that output would rise by more under WTO. In fact in five 
countries (Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela and the Dominican 
Republic) the reverse is true. For Mexico and the Dominican Republic as noted above 
that is because going to the full WTO reduces output rather than increasing it. In 
Paraguay and Venezuela FTAA negatively affects output as under the WTO scenario, 
but less so under the former. 
In all cases the FTAA causes a big rise in imports and a smaller rise in exports. 
With a fixed exchange rate there is an expansionary rise in foreign saving and 
absorption whereas if foreign saving is fixed there is a devaluation and a bigger 
increase in exports. It is likely that this simulation underestimates the full effect of a 
FTAA on exports within the region. By assumption, in almost all countries all sector 
commodity markets are treated as homogeneous. That means that each sector in each 
country is assumed to see its output at world prices adjusted by tariffs or subsidies. 
How much is consumed nationally and how much is exported depends on internal 
demand elasticities. No distinction is made for the nationality of the buyer. 
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3.2.6 Terms-of-trade  shock 
We simulate an adverse terms-of-trade shock represented by a uniform 10% 
increase in import prices. Not surprisingly an increase in the price of imports is highly 
contractionary in every country, whether we fixed the exchange rate or foreign saving. 
Absorption, investment and employment all fall and there is a significant depreciation 
of the real exchange rate. With fixed foreign saving there is also a substantial 
reduction in exports as domestic productive capacity is switched to the production of 
import substitutes. 
 
3.2.7 Productivity  shock 
Our CGE models are not dynamic. They do not link changes in the sectoral 
production functions to investment or the growth in labor. To obtain a simple 
approximation of dynamic growth effects we increase the constant term (technology 
parameter) in each sector’s production function by ten percent (it works as a parallel 
shift in the production function). This, of course, generates a large positive impact on 
output, employment and poverty. The magnitude of the impact depends in part on our 
assumption that all labor supplies are endogenous, so that any increase in productivity 
permits a large increase in employment, virtually doubling the effect of the change in 
productivity on output. Exports grow rapidly under either closure, but if the nominal 
exchange rate is fixed imports and foreign saving grow even more rapidly. 
It is not at all surprising that productivity growth would have such a large 
growth effect given the assumptions underlying the model. However, the size of the 
impacts on poverty, which are larger than any of the trade-related shocks or reforms 
serve to remind us of the crucial importance of investment and growth in the struggle 
to reduce poverty. 
 
3.2.8 Country-specific  closures 
The country studies have used a mixture of country closure, but the key 
difference of most is the use of a Keynesian macro closure with investment driving 
savings adjustments through income multiplier effects. Under the specifications of the 
CGE model, this implies an independent investment function which leaves the level of 
investment fixed under the given closure rule. The upshot is that despite the demand-
driven macroeconomic adjustment imposed by this closure rule, output effects tend to 
be smaller than under the balanced savings-investment closure of the standardized 
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simulations, as this allows for some endogenous investment adjustment. Otherwise 
the macroeconomic results under the country-specific results are broadly consistent 
with the findings above, showing expansionary effects of both unilateral trade 
liberalization (tariff cuts) and the FTAA scenario in all cases but Brazil and 
Venezuela (the latter only in case of FTAA). The same countries plus Mexico also 
would lose (mildly) under the WTO scenario. 
 
3.3  Skill-intensity and the total demand for labor under different scenarios 
We find that in almost all cases removing barriers to trade and increasing openness 
lead to an equilibrium increase in output and, as we will see, an increase in total 
employment.  The question we wish to address here is what the change in production 
structure does to skill-intensity. That is does increased openness imply an increase in 
the relative demand for skilled labor or does it favor Latin America’s more abundant 
unskilled labor. Under the standardized labor market closure rule we use the 
simplifying assumption that there is an excess supply of all types of labor, or in other 
words that relative wages arebfixed  at  their  base period level in each country.  
Therefore,  in the simulations reported here, the results will be stated in terms of 
increases in the quantity demanded of labor. When we speak of an increase or 
decrease in skill-intensity, we mean that this is what would happen if relative wages 
were constant. If we were to drop that assumption, an increase in skill-intensity would 
also be reflected in a rise in earnings differentials by skills. In the country case 
studies, a variety of different assumptions were used. In some cases, all of labor 
supply was assumed fixed; in others, the supply of skilled labor was exogenous and 
fixed and unskilled labor was flexible and demand-determined. When we discuss the 
simulation results for poverty and distribution, derived from the country studies, we 
will revert to the country assumptions on labor market closures. 
Skill-intensity may rise or fall following trade opening depending on whether 
skilled or unskilled labor is more important in traded goods sectors. Our CGE models 
can shed important light on these questions because they are based on observed, 
sector- specific production functions and skill-intensities. Each country has a different 
disaggregation of labor, but in all cases the disaggregation permits us to separate 
factor demand by skill, generally defined in terms of education level. In some cases 
rural and urban labor are reported separately so that we can see what happens to rural- 
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TABLE 1  CGE simulations – Standardized closures: macroeconomic indicators (real 
values and percentage change from base) – Foreign Savings fixed (flexible 
exchange rate) 
 
BASE Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 274 38 74388 2907 1218 2979 28424 1091 70 2424 20090 98 118 126 20687
Absorption 276 40 74777 2927 1290 3092 28464 1223 67 2370 27893 94 124 124 23757
Household consumption 205 28 48422 1747 825 2166 19869 937 46 1694 20939 65 100 91 18767
Investment 48 6 14888 819 254 538 5412 178 16 488 5420 21 21 18 3477
Government consumption 23 5 11466 361 210 389 3182 109 5 189 1534 9 4 15 1513
Exports 16 8 5546 852 180 1220 7128 271 26 999 3604 13 47 22 10370
Imports 23 11 7148 1139 266 1422 8127 419 37 968 13946 22 57 25 6083
Real exchange rate 100 90 97 94 100 100 100 100 91 100 93 87 100 100 90
Tariff cut Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0.8 -0.1 1.1 4.7 0.9 1.6 0.1 1.5 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.6
Absorption 0.1 0.8 -0.3 1.2 4.3 0.9 1.5 0.2 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.5
Household consumption 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.2 4.4 0.9 1.6 0.2 1.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.4
Investment 0.5 1.5 -0.8 1.4 4.3 1.3 1.6 0.5 1.7 0.4 0.0 1.1 2.7 1.1 0.5
Government consumption      0.3 0.0 0.5 3.8 0.0 0.7 -0.1 1.7 0.3 1.3 0.2 1.5 0.3 0.0
Exports 2.8 2.2 1.1 2.5 7.4 2.1 2.6 1.6 3.3 0.5 1.8 4.0 5.6 1.8 0.9
Imports 2.4 1.8 0.7 2.1 5.3 1.9 2.4 1.1 2.8 0.5 0.9 3.3 5.1 1.6 0.9
Real exchange rate 2.4 1.4 0.5 1.3 1.4 1.1 2.1 0.9 0.7 0.3 1.3 1.4 0.7 1.0 3.4
Foreign savings increase Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.8 1.6 0.7 1.2 0.5 2.2 3.1 1.6 0.1 -0.3 0.3 4.2
Absorption 1.0 2.9 0.0 3.6 2.7 4.5 3.8 2.3 5.5 7.2 2.1 1.3 3.3 2.1 4.7
Household consumption 0.9 2.9 0.0 3.5 2.8 4.4 3.4 2.3 5.1 7.2 2.0 1.2 3.1 1.8 0.0
Investment 1.2 3.4 0.0 4.0 2.7 5.1 5.3 2.7 6.4 7.6 2.3 1.6 4.7 3.9 12.2
Government consumption 0.9 2.9 0.0 3.1 2.6 4.0 3.0 1.7 6.6 6.0 2.0 1.3 2.6 1.9 0.0
Exports -5.1 -4.2 0.0 -5.1 -3.7 -4.9 -3.5 -3.8 -5.3 -5.5 -2.4 -6.2 -12.7 -5.5 -6.2
Imports 3.8 4.8 0.0 4.3 4.5 4.6 6.1 4.2 3.8 4.8 2.6 3.1 -2.0 4.2 10.7
Real exchange rate -4.7 -3.9 0.0 -4.8 -2.3 -3.0 -5.4 -3.2 -5.3 -6.9 -2.7 -3.7 -5.4 -4.8 -3.3
Terms-of-trade shock: Import price 
increase Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) -1.4 -6.2 -0.1 -6.6 -16.5 -7.4 -8.2 -4.6 -11.8 -11.8 -9.3 -2.3 -8.4 -4.2 -3.2
Absorption -1.5 -5.9 -1.1 -6.6 -15.1 -7.2 -8.0 -4.4 -11.3 -11.9 -7.1 -2.5 -8.2 -4.5 -13.0
Household consumption -1.3 -5.6 -1.6 -6.6 -15.4 -7.2 -8.0 -4.4 -10.8 -12.1 -6.9 -2.2 -7.3 -4.1 -12.2
Investment -2.1 -8.0 -0.2 -7.3 -15.2 -8.7 -9.9 -5.1 -12.3 -12.0 -8.2 -3.7 -12.2 -7.4 -17.2
Government consumption -1.3 -4.6 0.0 -5.0 -13.7 -4.8 -5.3 -4.0 -12.6 -10.0 -6.9 -2.2 -9.6 -3.5 0.0
Exports 1.7 -2.2 5.4 -1.1 -17.2 -0.9 -3.8 -2.2 -5.0 -0.8 -2.2 1.5 -26.1 -0.6 -8.9
Imports -8.0 -10.7 -6.1 -9.4 -20.2 -9.8 -12.3 -10.5 -12.6 -9.9 -9.8 -8.2 -29.4 -9.6 -17.2
Real exchange rate 7.7 5.3 -11.6 6.2 3.6 5.5 4.3 5.8 8.7 7.9 8.9 6.6 13.5 6.6 -9.1
Terms-of-trade shock: Export price 
increase Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 1.2 6.0 0.0 6.6 21.0 7.4 8.3 4.7 11.3 11.9 6.9 2.3 8.5 4.2 1.3
Absorption 1.2 5.4 0.0 6.5 18.7 6.9 8.1 3.6 10.3 12.1 3.7 2.2 8.5 4.3 -3.3
Household consumption 1.1 5.2 0.0 6.6 19.2 7.0 8.1 3.5 10.0 12.4 3.6 1.9 7.5 3.9 -0.9
Investment 1.8 7.6 0.0 7.2 18.7 8.5 10.1 4.1 11.1 12.2 4.4 3.3 13.1 7.1 7.0
Government consumption 1.0 3.9 0.0 4.7 16.8 4.3 4.9 3.3 11.6 9.8 3.5 1.9 9.8 3.3 0.0
Exports -0.3 2.9 0.0 1.3 23.8 1.3 4.0 4.3 4.4 0.4 6.4 0.2 17.1 1.0 -10.0
Imports 7.6 10.8 0.0 10.0 25.8 10.4 13.5 9.9 12.5 11.0 6.0 8.3 25.4 10.1 7.1
Real exchange rate -5.7 -4.1 0.0 -5.4 -2.7 -4.8 -4.0 -4.0 -7.4 -7.3 -3.6 -5.4 -14.2 -5.6 -13.0
Productivity shock Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 15.0 18.5 10.1 20.7 81.6 14.9 27.6 14.9 23.0 26.9 12.4 13.8 13.9 23.0 10.1
Absorption 15.7 18.2 9.6 20.8 76.9 14.8 26.8 13.7 21.6 27.0 10.8 13.9 13.8 23.7 14.5
Household consumption 14.8 18.0 7.1 20.3 77.6 14.4 27.5 13.4 22.2 27.5 10.9 13.4 13.3 22.9 13.6
Investment 16.7 17.4 25.4 21.1 74.0 15.1 25.6 14.7 21.1 23.9 10.0 14.5 14.5 26.5 19.8
Government consumption 21.4 20.0 0.0 22.1 77.6 16.4 24.3 14.1 17.6 30.5 12.0 16.3 22.0 25.0 0.0
Exports 19.2 21.2 13.7 20.6 100.0 15.6 27.1 19.7 22.1 18.9 25.5 17.0 21.0 22.4 12.0
Imports 14.9 17.4 8.4 19.6 71.5 14.2 25.2 13.2 19.4 20.0 8.9 13.4 18.4 20.5 13.9
Real exchange rate 1.0 4.3 -6.3 2.2 4.2 1.2 6.6 1.6 2.0 5.6 8.5 1.1 -0.7 2.0 2.8
Export subsidy increase Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0.3 2.8 -0.1 3.2 17.8 2.7 5.0 1.8 5.3 5.4 3.2 1.0 5.0 2.2 1.4
Absorption 0.3 2.5 -0.1 3.0 15.9 2.4 4.6 1.2 4.8 5.4 1.6 0.9 5.0 2.2 -2.8
Household consumption 0.2 2.3 0.8 3.2 16.3 2.5 4.9 1.1 4.8 5.7 1.5 0.7 4.3 2.1 -3.1
Investment 0.6 4.3 -3.0 3.3 15.9 3.4 5.1 1.4 4.8 5.1 2.0 1.8 8.0 3.3 3.9
Government consumption 0.1 1.0 0.0 1.7 14.1 0.4 2.0 1.6 5.0 4.1 1.5 0.6 7.2 1.5 0.0
Exports 4.9 7.3 3.6 6.9 29.3 6.1 8.2 8.7 10.4 6.3 9.2 7.2 33.8 6.6 2.0
Imports 3.9 6.0 2.2 6.0 20.9 5.7 7.6 5.9 8.9 6.7 3.3 5.8 29.2 6.0 1.9
Real exchange rate -5.5 -4.8 2.0 -5.9 -4.5 -6.6 -3.4 -5.2 -6.9 -6.1 -3.4 -7.0 -12.6 -5.7 -3.7
FTAA scenario Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0.1 1.2 0.0 1.1 7.6 1.3 2.4 0.3 2.2 0.3 -0.3 0.4 1.1 0.7 -0.9
Absorption 0.2 1.3 0.0 1.1 7.0 1.2 2.3 0.4 2.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.7 0.8 -4.6
Household consumption 0.1 1.2 0.2 1.2 7.2 1.3 2.4 0.4 2.1 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.2 0.7 -0.3
Investment 0.5 2.2 -0.7 1.3 7.0 1.9 2.8 0.6 2.3 0.2 -0.3 1.7 3.9 1.2 -11.5
Government consumption 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 6.2 0.1 1.1 -0.1 2.4 0.2 2.0 0.0 2.1 0.4 0.0
Exports 3.0 3.2 0.9 2.5 12.0 2.8 3.5 2.2 4.1 0.2 2.9 7.7 7.7 2.0 -1.6
Imports 2.6 2.8 0.7 2.0 8.7 2.8 3.5 1.6 3.7 0.3 1.1 5.4 7.1 2.0 -1.1
Real exchange rate 2.3 2.2 0.6 1.4 2.2 1.2 2.4 1.1 0.4 0.1 2.6 2.8 0.6 1.0 -1.5
WTO scenario Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0.9 4.2 0.0 0.5 13.9 2.5 6.7 -0.1 10.3 -0.9 -2.1 2.4 0.2 2.5 -1.7
Absorption 1.0 3.8 -0.1 0.5 11.3 2.4 6.3 0.1 9.5 -0.6 -1.2 1.8 1.0 2.5 -6.2
Household consumption 0.8 3.9 0.4 0.6 11.7 2.4 6.6 0.1 9.4 -0.9 -1.0 1.0 0.4 2.5 -1.6
Investment 2.1 4.9 -1.6 0.7 11.2 3.9 7.2 0.7 9.8 0.3 -2.6 4.5 4.2 3.2 -14.2
Government consumption 0.6 2.3 0.0 -0.4 9.7 0.0 2.9 -0.2 9.5 -0.7 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.3 0.0
Exports 7.6 4.4 2.2 5.1 17.7 3.9 8.3 2.5 8.1 -0.4 4.6 8.9 4.6 4.0 -1.5
Imports 10.3 6.8 1.5 1.7 14.6 5.2 9.7 1.0 12.0 -0.6 -0.9 22.8 4.2 7.1 -3.7
Real exchange rate -0.6 2.7 1.2 4.3 2.4 -0.9 3.0 2.1 -2.8 -0.8 6.3 -20.7 2.0 -0.8 -0.5
Source:Authors’ calculations.  
Note: Cuba not included in this exercise because it is not realistic to assume a flexible exchange rate. 
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TABLE 2       CGE simulations – Standardized closures: macroeconomic indicators 
(real values and percentage change from base) — (exchange rate fixed) 
 
BASE Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 274 38 74388 29 2907 1218 2979 28424 1091 70 2424 20090 98 118 126 20687
Absorption 276 40 74777 30 2927 1290 3092 28464 1223 67 2370 27893 94 124 124 23757
Household consumption 205 28 48422 22 1747 825 2166 19869 937 46 1694 20939 65 100 91 18767
Investment 48 6 14888 2 819 254 538 5412 178 16 488 5420 21 21 18 3477
Government consumption 23 5 11466 6 361 210 389 3182 109 5 189 1534 9 4 15 1513
Exports 16 8 5546 4 852 180 1220 7128 271 26 999 3604 13 47 22 10370
Imports 23 11 7148 5 1139 266 1422 8127 419 37 968 13946 22 57 25 6083
Real exchange rate 100 90 97 94 100 100 100 100 91 100 93 87 100 100 90
Tariff cut Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0.2 1.3 0.0 -0.1 1.4 6.2 1.4 2.1 0.3 2.0 0.6 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.9
Absorption 0.6 2.3 0.1 -0.7 2.7 7.0 4.6 3.3 1.3 2.9 0.9 1.9 1.3 2.2 1.2 0.7
Household consumption 0.5 2.2 0.3 -0.7 2.7 7.1 4.6 3.2 1.3 2.8 0.9 1.9 1.1 1.8 1.1 0.3
Investment 1.1 3.2 -0.5 0.1 3.0 7.0 5.6 4.2 1.7 3.2 1.0 1.6 2.0 4.1 2.2 0.0
Government consumption 0.5 1.8 0.0 -1.1 1.8 6.3 3.4 2.2 0.7 3.3 0.7 2.7 1.0 2.3 0.8 0.0
Exports 0 . 00 . 00 . 20 . 00 . 23 . 4 - 1 . 90 . 7 - 0 . 21 . 90 . 10 . 1 - 0 . 31 . 80 . 20
Imports 4 . 44 . 21 . 20 . 33 . 89 . 85 . 85 . 42 . 93 . 70 . 92 . 64 . 94 . 52 . 80
Real exchange rate - 0 . 2- 0 . 5 1 . 7 - 0 . 6- 0 . 9- 1 . 4- 0 . 6- 0 . 4- 0 . 6- 0 . 2- 0 . 6- 0 . 5- 0 . 8- 0 . 3- 2
Devaluation Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) -0.8 -2.7 -0.1 1.7 -1.4 -2.6 -2.1 -2.1 -1.0 -3.7 -3.7 -6.7 -0.1 2.0 -0.3 -2.3
Absorption -2.2 -9.8 -1.1 1.0 -16.3 -10.9 -22.6 -7.8 -11.3 -11.9 -12.1 -9.6 -4.4 -9.2 -5.1 -14.6
Household consumption -2.1 -9.6 -0.7 1.1 -15.9 -11.0 -22.2 -7.2 -11.4 -11.0 -12.1 -9.4 -4.2 -8.7 -4.4 -10.0
Investment -2.7 -10.6 -3.0 -1.4 -17.4 -10.8 -24.9 -10.6 -12.8 -13.8 -12.6 -10.8 -5.1 -11.9 -8.9 -44.6
Government consumption -2.1 -10.0 0.0 1.6 -15.5 -10.7 -21.5 -7.2 -8.3 -14.0 -10.7 -9.3 -4.3 -7.4 -4.7 0.0
Exports 12.1 15.7 8.4 10.0 32.7 35.6 25.1 8.3 23.9 12.6 11.2 12.3 23.6 33.1 15.0 6.6
Imports -7.5 -13.6 -3.7 7.1 -12.9 -17.2 -19.8 -11.2 -16.3 -7.0 -6.4 -11.4 -8.5 4.4 -8.2 -17.9
Real exchange rate 10.5 12.4 -8.8 12.1 12.4 12.8 11.1 13.1 11.7 11.5 13.7 11.4 10.9 10.9 -8.4
Terms-of-trade shock: Import price 
increase Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) -1.3 -6.7 0.0 -10.4 -6.8 -18.8 -8.2 -8.9 -4.6 -11.5 -11.8 -10.4 -2.3 -8.3 -4.2 -2.3
Absorption -1.1 -7.4 -0.3 -10.6 -7.3 -19.7 -13.1 -10.0 -6.5 -10.4 -11.2 -8.6 -2.3 -3.0 -4.4 -9.6
Household consumption -1.0 -7.1 -1.0 -8.4 -7.3 -20.0 -13.1 -9.8 -6.4 -10.0 -11.4 -8.3 -2.0 -2.4 -4.0 -10.2
Investment -1.7 -9.7 1.8 0.4 -8.1 -19.8 -15.3 -12.4 -7.5 -11.3 -11.3 -9.8 -3.5 -5.4 -7.2 -5.7
Government consumption -1.0 -6.2 0.0 -23.3 -5.6 -18.1 -10.5 -7.1 -5.6 -11.6 -9.4 -8.3 -2.1 -5.3 -3.5 0.0
Exports -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.0          -8.1 5.8 -2.1 1.5 -5.8 -1.4 -0.5 0.4 -41.3 -0.8 -8.1
Imports -6.9 -12.9 -3.5 0.6 -10.2 -27.1 -15.0 -15.0 -13.7 -12.1 -9.5 -11.5 -8.0 -29.9 -9.4 -12.8
Real exchange rate 6 . 07 . 4 - 5 . 5 7 . 19 . 09 . 47 . 18 . 87 . 77 . 1 1 1 . 06 . 56 . 36 . 4 - 7
Terms-of-trade shock: Export price 
increase Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0.4 4.0 0.0 0.3 5.7 18.5 6.0 7.5 3.9 7.5 7.9 3.7 2.2 14.3 4.0 4.0
Absorption -1.0 -2.0 0.0 -0.5 -4.9 11.7 -7.7 3.0 -4.3 -2.4 -1.0 -1.1 -2.1 -5.8 -0.7 -4.6
Household consumption -1.0 -2.0 0.0 -1.4 -4.5 12.1 -7.4 3.4 -4.4 -1.9 -0.7 -1.1 -2.2 -5.8 -0.4 -4.2
Investment -0.9 -0.6 0.0 -0.9 -5.2 11.7 -7.9 2.7 -4.8 -3.5 -1.6 -1.0 -1.6 -6.3 -1.7 -6.3
Government consumption -1.1 -3.5 0.0 3.3 -5.7 10.0 -8.9 0.5 -2.3 -3.4 -1.5 -1.1 -2.3 -1.3 -1.2
Exports 12.1 14.5 0.0 2.9 22.4 41.2 17.0 10.5 20.5 18.6 12.6 12.7 23.1 77.9 15.8 1.0
Imports -0.7 -0.6 0.0 1.6 -1.0 13.6 -4.1 4.9 -2.4 4.8 3.2 0.0 -0.5 36.9 1.3 -3.4
Real exchange rate 4.5 4.9 0.0 4.9 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.2 3.9 4.3 2.6 4.9 4.6 4.4 5.4
Productivity shock Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 15.1 19.7 10.1 20.2 21.1 88.2 15.1 28.7 15.1 24.9 30.2 17.6 13.8 14.1 23.1 7.5
Absorption 15.9 21.6 10.5 19.8 23.0 87.8 16.6 32.5 14.9 26.6 34.9 18.0 14.3 12.9 24.8 5.3
Household consumption 15.0 21.3 7.7 40.3 22.5 88.6 16.2 32.7 14.7 26.9 35.4 17.9 13.7 12.5 23.8 9.3
Investment 16.9 21.3 27.8 25.6 23.6 84.7 17.3 33.8 16.2 26.8 32.1 18.1 15.0 13.4 28.5 11.4
Government consumption 21.6 23.5 0.0 -59.3 24.1 88.2 18.1 28.9 15.1 23.4 37.4 19.1 16.7 21.3 26.0 0.0
Exports 17.4 16.4 6.9 0.0 17.3 87.1 13.6 19.7 17.3 17.2 12.6 16.5 15.0 24.1 19.4 12.1
Imports 15.5 22.8 11.7 5.3 22.1 88.4 16.1 34.5 15.3 22.7 24.8 17.7 14.1 18.9 22.6 0.7
Real exchange rate 0.4 0.4 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.8 0.2 -2.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.9
Export subsidy increase Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) -0.3 1.4 -0.1 1.6 2.1 16.4 1.1 4.7 0.9 2.8 3.3 1.3 0.6 7.2 2.0 0.3
Absorption -1.0 -2.0 -0.8 -0.4 -4.9 11.7 -8.1 2.9 -4.3 -2.4 -1.0 -1.1 -2.1 -5.8 -0.6 -7.4
Household consumption -1.0 -2.0 0.3 -0.2 -4.5 12.1 -7.8 3.4 -4.4 -1.9 -0.8 -1.1 -2.2 -5.9 -0.3 -9.9
Investment -0.9 -0.6 -5.1 -0.1 -5.2 11.7 -8.3 2.6 -4.8 -3.5 -1.6 -1.0 -1.6 -6.3 -1.6 -8.0
Government consumption -1.1 -3.5 0.0 -0.9 -5.7 10.0 -9.2 0.5 -2.3 -3.4 -1.5 -1.1 -2.3 -1.3 -1.1 0.0
Exports 12.1 14.5 8.9 8.4 22.4 41.2 17.4 10.5 20.5 18.7 12.8 12.7 23.1 78.6 15.1 5.1
Imports -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 -0.9 -1.0 13.6 -4.3 4.9 -2.4 4.8 3.2 0.0 -0.5 37.4 1.3 -5.3
Real exchange rate 0.1 0.4 -3.6 0.0 -0.8 -1.1 -0.9 0.2 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -3.5
FTAA scenario Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0 . 32 . 00 . 01 . 71 . 4 1 0 . 21 . 92 . 90 . 52 . 60 . 41 . 40 . 30 . 90 . 80
Absorption 0 . 73 . 70 . 11 . 02 . 8 1 1 . 66 . 04 . 51 . 83 . 30 . 62 . 81 . 12 . 91 . 4 - 6
Household consumption 0 . 63 . 50 . 31 . 42 . 8 1 1 . 96 . 04 . 31 . 83 . 20 . 62 . 80 . 72 . 31 . 3 - 1
Investment 1.1 5.0 -0.4 0.5 3.1 11.6 7.3 5.9 2.2 3.6 0.6 2.2 2.3 5.6 2.4 -18.9
Government consumption 0.6 2.8 0.0 -0.1 1.9 10.5 4.3 2.9 0.9 3.8 0.5 4.2 0.5 3.0 1.0 0.0
Exports 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 5.4 -2.3 1.2 -0.2 2.9 0.0 0.2 4.4 3.0 0.2 -1.5
Imports 4 . 66 . 61 . 10 . 23 . 9 1 6 . 57 . 87 . 04 . 14 . 40 . 54 . 05 . 86 . 43 . 2 - 4
Real exchange rate -0.2 -1.0 1.5 -0.7 -1.5 -2.0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 2.6 -1.2 -0.5 -0.9
WTO scenario Argentina Bolivia Brasil Cuba Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep. Uruguay Venezuela
GDP (factor prices) 0.7 4.3 0.0 -2.9 0.7 13.9 2.4 6.9 0.1 9.0 -1.8 -1.5 0.3 -0.1 2.5 0.9
Absorption 0.2 4.3 0.2 -3.5 1.9 13.5 0.8 8.1 1.1 5.2 -3.1 0.0 -6.4 2.9 1.4 -6.7
Household consumption 0.1 4.3 0.6 -3.2 2.0 14.0 0.9 8.2 1.0 5.5 -3.4 -0.2 -6.3 2.1 1.6 -1.9
Investment 1.1 5.5 -1.0 -0.5 2.2 13.4 2.1 9.8 1.9 4.9 -2.4 -1.6 -6.5 6.7 1.3 -15.9
Government consumption -0.2 2.8 0.0 -5.8 0.9 11.7 -1.4 4.4 0.5 4.3 -2.8 1.5 -6.3 2.1 0.4 0.0
Exports 13.9 3.7 0.3 1.5 2.8 14.7 5.7 6.0 0.8 12.8 1.7 3.6 32.7 -1.5 6.8 -1.5
Imports 7 . 57 . 72 . 51 . 03 . 3 1 8 . 33 . 7 1 2 . 82 . 79 . 1 - 2 . 10 . 1 - 8 . 93 . 75 . 2 - 4










Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  29 
urban differentials in addition to what happens for the entire economy or in the urban 
sector considered separately. In most countries there was a finer disaggregation of 
labor than we show here. In table 3 we have chosen one category of urban (male) 
labor, generally defined as unskilled salaried male labor in the formal sector and 
compared it to skilled salaried labor in the formal sector. Where there is a 
disaggregation into rural and urban labor, we have compared the change in the 
demand for rural unskilled labor to urban unskilled labor. 
Does trade liberalization or reducing tariffs increase skill-intensity? According 
to the left-hand columns of table 3, the short answer is that it depends. In about half of 
our countries it does while in the other half it does not. Recall that when foreign 
saving is fixed, tariff reductions lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and 
export-led growth. When trade liberalization occurs with fixed exchange rates there is 
an  increase in foreign saving, an appreciation of the real exchange rate and growth  is  
TABLE 3 
CGE simulations – standardized closure rules: changes in skill intensity of urban and rural labor 
 
Tariff reduction  Increase Foreign 
Savings 
Increase export subsidies 
 
Urban unskilled 
/ agr. unskilled 








Urban unskilled / 
agr. unskilled 



















Argentina rises  rises falls  falls  falls falls  rises  rises  rises  falls 
Bolivia     no 
change  falls   rises     falls  falls 
Brazil     rises  rises            
Chile     falls  falls    rises      falls  falls 
Colombia     rises  rises    falls        rises 
Costa 
Rica  rises falls  rises  falls  rises  rises falls  falls  falls  falls 
Ecuador    falls  falls   no 
change     falls  falls 
El 
Salvador     falls  rises    falls      rises 
Honduras falls    rises  rises  rises falls  rises  rises  rises  rises 
Mexico rises  rises  rises  no 
change  rises rises  falls  rises  rises  rises 
Paraguay    rises  no 
change    no 





Peru rises  rises  falls  falls  falls rises  rises  rises  falls  falls 
Dom. Rep.  rises  rises  falls  rises  rises rises  rises  rises  falls  falls 
Uruguay    falls  falls   rises     falls  falls 
Venezuela                  
Note: Directions of change refer to relative growth rates in demand for labor categories. They tell whether growth 
was relatively skill intensive or whether it favored unskilled urban or rural workers. Since classifications of factors in 
the country CGE models do not always exactly coincide with those of this table, we take for agriculture/non-
agriculture specifications in country CGE’s unskilled formal sector labor relative to agricultural unskilled labor. For 
urban breakdowns we use formal sector skilled relative to formal sector unskilled. Where there is a gender 
breakdown, we use the series for males. 
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led by non-traded goods as well as investment. But despite this difference in the 
composition of growth, factor intensity moves in the same direction in all but two 
cases. Essentially the pattern depends on skill intensities in the traded goods 
industries, both those producing exports and import substitutes. For the fixed 
exchange rate regime, the result depends as well on factor intensities in the non-traded 
goods and investment sectors, both of which lead the response to tariff reduction 
when the nominal exchange rate is fixed. 
One further pattern is that in all but one of the cases where we have 
information on rural labor, trade liberalization increased the demand for urban labor 
relative to rural or agricultural labor. While the demand for agricultural labor seldom 
falls absolutely, it rises by significantly less than either of the urban labor categories. 
In this way, trade liberalization is likely to be accompanied by rising labor and income 
inequality even though the expansion in total output will reduce poverty at the same 
time.   
Are traded or non-traded goods more skill intensive? We can address that 
question by seeing what happens to labor demand when there is an either a 
devaluation or an appreciation of the real exchange rate in response to a rise in foreign 
saving. Results show that skill intensity widens in eight countries and falls in four as 
the economy shifts over to the production of more non-traded goods in response to the 
rise in foreign saving.  Rural workers lose in most of the countries for which we have 
information because they are dependent on agricultural traded goods production. 
Traded goods can, of course, be either import substitutes or exports. In the 
right hand column of table 3, we show the results of the simulation in which we 
increased all export subsidies by 10%. When we do that there is an expansion of 
employment in those sectors producing exports. Skill intensity falls in eight countries 
and rises in five. In all but two of those cases the changes in skill intensity are the 
opposite of what was observed with the increase in foreign saving. That is, increasing 
export production has the opposite effect on skill intensity of increasing non-traded 
goods. That says that there is no important difference in most cases between the 
import-substituting part of tradable and the exporting part. The experiment also tells 
us that in most countries exports are not relatively skill-intensive which implies that 
pursing export-led growth should not increase inequality. 
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TABLE 4  
CGE Macro-micro simulations – Country-specific closures 
(changes represent deviations from base) 
   Macro outcomes  Labor demand  Wages  Microsimulations
 
Output Exports  Employment Unskilled Skilled Skill 
intensity
Average Skill diff. Poverty Inequality
Devaluation                  
Argentina -0.9  57.6  +  + +  +/0  +  +/0  1.6 0.4 
Bolivia -1.1  6.3 -  -  -  +  0  0  1.3  0.9 
Brazil -0.04  9.0  - -  -  -  -  +/0  -0.2  -0.2 
Cuba 0.9  0.0  +  +  +  +/0  +  +  -0.10  -0.01 
Chile -0.6  7.7  -  -  -  -  -/0  -/0  1.4  0.8 
Colombia -1.2  31.5  0  0 0 0 -  -/0  0.6  0 
Costa Rica  -0.1  6.5  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.6  -0.2 
Ecuador 0.0  5.7 -  -  0  +  -  -  0.4  -0.7 
El Salvador  -0.7  17.3  +  +  -  -  -  -  5.1  1.8 
Honduras -10.4  15.5  -  --  + +  -  +  4.8 2.3 
Mexico -0.1  22.1 -  -  0  +  -  +  1.9  -0.1 
Paraguay -3.7  11.3  -  - -  0 0  0  4.8  1.4 
Peru -1.5  40.5  -  -  -  -  +  0  1.2  0.3 
R. Dom  1.2  27.3  +  +  -  --  +  +  -2.8  -0.5 
Uruguay -1.7  12.5 0  0  0  0  -  +  0.4  -0.44 
Venezuela 1.5  -9.4  -  -  - +  -  0  1.2  -0.3 
Tariff cut                  
Argentina 0.3  4.2  +  + +  0 -  -/0  -0.9  0.3 
Bolivia 0.8  0.3  + +  +  0  0  0 -1.8  0.7 
Brazil -0.1  0.1  +  +  +  +  +  +/0  -1.2  -0.2 
Cuba 0.0  0.0  -/0  -/0  -/0  0  -/0  +/0  n.a  n.a. 
Chile 0.7  1.8  +  +  +  -/0  +/0  0  -4.5  -0.3 
Colombia 0.3  3.8  0  0 0  0 +  -/0  -5.6  0.0 
Costa Rica  0.3  -0.4  +  +  +  +/0  +  +  -0.3  0.1 
Ecuador 0.3  0.1 +  +  0  -  +  +  0.3  0.2 
El Salvador  0.3  -0.2  +  +  +  +  +  +  -0.7  -1.0 
Honduras 1.9  1.3  +  + +  - +  -  -1.3  -0.5 
Mexico 0.1  0.4  +/0  +/0  0  -  +  -  -0.3  -0.1 
Paraguay 1.1  0.1  +  +  +  -  0  0  -2.4  -0.6 
Peru 0.4  3.4  +  +  +  -  +  0  -1.3  0.7 
R. Dom  0.7  6.8  +  +  -  -  +  +  -1.4  -0.2 
Uruguay 0.0  1.8  0  0  0  0  +  -  -0.4  -0.1 
Venezuela 0.1  0.5  +  +  + + +  0  -1.0  -0.1 
Export subsidy increase                
Argentina 0.3  5.7  +  + +  -  ++  0  2.5  0.5 
Bolivia 1.2  7.2  + +  +  +  0  0 -4.2  -1.8 
Brazil -0.5  -3.1  +/0  +/0  +/0  -/0  +  +  -4.4  -0.2 
Cuba 1.0  5.4  +  +  +  -  +/0  +  -0.11  -0.01 
Chile 1.9  5.0  +  +  +  -  +  -/0  -11.9  -0.9 
Colombia 0.6  8.9  0  0 0  0  +  -  -1.0  0.0 
Costa Rica  0.0  0.4  +/0  +/0  +/0  -/0  +/0  -/0  -0.1  0.1 
Ecuador 0.2  0.6 +  +  0  -  +/0  +  0.0  -0.1 
El Salvador  1.1  15.4  +  +  +  -  +/0  -  1.6  -3.1 
Honduras -0.04  0.2  -/0  -/0 0  +/0  +/0  0  0.1 0.1 
Mexico 0.9  1.5  + +  0  -  +  - -2.4  -0.5 
Paraguay 1.3  12.0 +  +  +  -  0  0  -4.0  -1.1 
Peru                       
R.  Dom  1.3  16.4  +  +  - - + +  -3.1 -0.7 
Uruguay 0.0  0.3 0  0  0  0  +/0  0  -0.1  0.0 
Venezuela 0.2  3.2  -  -  - - + 0  -2.0  0.2 
FTAA             
Argentina 0.4  4.3  +  + +  0 - 0  -1.7  0.3 
Bolivia 1.2  0.5  + +  ++  +  0  0  -3.9  -2.3 
Brazil  -0.4  1.0  +  + +  + + +  -1.2 -0.3 
Cuba 0.1  5.4  +  +  +  0  +  +  n.a  n.a. 
Chile 0.7  1.6  +  +  +  -  +  -/0  -4.9  -0.3 
Colombia 0.4  5.9  0  0 0  0  +  -/0  -6.9 0.0 
Costa  Rica 0.2  4.7  +  + +  + + +  -0.4  0.3 
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   Macro outcomes  Labor demand  Wages  Microsimulations
Ecuador 0.4  3.4 +  +  0  -  +  +  0.2  0.1 
El Salvador  0.5  -0.2  +  +  +  -  +  +  -1.3  -0.7 
Honduras 1.2  2.4  +  +  +  -  + -  -0.7  -0.3 
Mexico 0.1  0.6  +/0  +/0  0  -  +  -  -0.3  -0.1 
Paraguay 0.3  0.0  +  +  +  +  0  0  0.7 0.4 
Peru 0.6  4.8  +  +  +  -  +  +  -1.6  0.4 
R. Dom  1.0  9.7  +  +  0  -  +  +  -2.7  -0.3 
Uruguay 0.0  2.2 0  0  0  0  +  -  -0.6  0.0 
Venezuela -0.1  -0.4  -  -  - 0  -  0  0.3  -0.4 
WTO             
Argentina 1.7  10.0  +  + +  +  ++  +  -1.2  0.1 
Bolivia 1.1  5.3  + +  ++  +  0  0  -3.1  -3.2 
Brazil  -0.4  2.0  +  + +  + + +  -1.4 -0.2 
Cuba 0.1  5.4  +  +  +  -/0  +  +  n.a.  n.a. 
Chile 0.9  3.9  +  +  +  -  +  -/0  -6.0  -0.5 
Colombia 0.4  7.8  0  0 0  0  + -  -7.4 0.0 
Costa  Rica 0.1  -1.2  0  -  +  + + +  0.9  0.6 
Ecuador 1.0  2.6 +  +  0  -  +  ++  0.2  0.3 
El Salvador  0.5  0.9  +  +  +  +  +  -  -1.0  -0.7 
Honduras 2.2  9.8  +  +  +  -  + -  -1.2  -0.4 
Mexico -0.2  -1.9  -/0  -/0  0  +  -  +  0.0  -0.1 
Paraguay 0.5  4.0  +  +  +  -  0  0  0.1  -0.3 
Peru 0.5  6.5  +  +  +  -  +  +  -2.0  0.9 
R. Dom  1.2  8.1  +  ++  +  --  +  +  -3.8  -1.2 
Uruguay 0.0  5.0 0  0  0  0  +  -  -2.0  -0.3 
Venezuela -0.3  1.6  -  -  - + +  0  0.2  -0.1 
             
Foreign Savings Increase             
Argentina 0.3  -7.4  0  0 0  0 +  -/0  1.3  0.5 
Bolivia 0.1  0.5  + +  +  +  0  0  -0.1  -0.8 
Brazil  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Cuba n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Chile 0.1  -0.7  +/0  +/0  +/0  +/0  0  0  -0.4  0.0 
Colombia 0.2  -2.0  0  0 0  0  + -  -0.2 0.0 
Costa  Rica 0.1  -0.4  +  + +  + + +  0.2  0.1 
Ecuador 0.1  -3.8  +  +  0  -  +  ++  0.6  0.3 
El  Salvador  4.0  -26.8 ++  ++  ++  + + +  -4.6 -5.0 
Honduras 2.1  -3.4  +  + -  -  + -  -1.4  -0.5 
Mexico -0.5  -10.3  + +  0  -  +  -  -1.9  -0.4 
Paraguay  0.8  -2.3  +  + +  0 0 0  -1.5 -0.4 
Peru  0.1  -2.7  +/0  +/0  +/0  0 -/0 0  -0.1  0.1 
R. Dom  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Uruguay 1.5  -19.8  0  0  0  0  +  +  -3.2  0.4 
Venezuela 1.9  -3.3  ++  + + - + 0  -3.1 -1.0 
Note:   + = increase,  
+/0 = slight increase (could be insignificant) 
++ strong increase, 0 = no (significant) change 
- = decrease 
-/0 = slight decrease (could be significant) 




However, when introducing the country-specific segmented labor market 
assumptions, this picture remains equally mixed and does not show an across-the-
board widening of the earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers due to 
trade liberalization (unilaterally or multilaterally). If countries apply a uniform tariff 
cut, the earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers is expected to increase in 
six country cases (Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador and Dominican 
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Republic) and only in Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay a smaller earnings gap is 
expected (see table 4). In all other countries, the simulation of further unilateral trade 
opening shows no substantial shifts in skill inequality. The multilateral trade 
liberalization scenarios show a somewhat stronger upward skill bias, partly 
compounded by negative effects on agricultural employment. Under the FTAA 
scenario, Peru is added to the country cases with rising wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers and under WTO scenario this also is the outcome for Argentina.  
Average real wage levels increase almost without exception in all trade opening 
scenarios for the country-specific labor market closures as a consequence of the 
generally expansionary effect on the economy. The poverty effects of these labor 
market outcomes will depend on the net impact of these shifts in aggregate and sector 
employment, mean earnings and earnings differentials. This we take up in the next 
section. 
 
4  THE IMPACT OF POLICY SIMULATIONS ON POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY 
4.1  Observed trends in the 1990s 
It is useful to begin the discussion of poverty and inequality with an overview 
of observed trends in those two variables. We have used the ECLAC estimations on 
household data to preserve comparability. ECLAC uses poverty lines that reflect the 
cost of a market purchased basket of necessities and they make a correction for 
underreporting of survey-based incomes and for income in kind, which was generally 
not done by our country authors. For these reasons the country level estimates shown 
in Annex table A.4 may differ from the poverty estimates in the country papers. That 
is of less concern to us here because what we want to determine are the trends in 
poverty over the 1990s rather than the levels of poverty. For that the estimates shown 
in the table are useful. For the region as a whole the total and extreme poverty 
incidence are presented in table 5 for the period 1980-1999, including estimations for 
2002.
24
                                                 
24 Information detailed by country can be found in the Annex table A.5. Estimations may differ from 
official national estimates, as well as to those reported by the country authors, due to adjustments made 
by ECLAC to keep income definitions comparable over time (and as much as possible, across 
countries), to deal with non-reported incomes, to deal with statistical discrepancies between household 
surveys and national accounts data and are, last but not in the least due to differences in poverty lines. 
The direction of change should be emphasized therefore, rather than the precise estimates. 
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TABLE 5 
Poverty in Latin America 
Total Poverty  Extreme Poverty 
Millions Percent  Millions  Percent 
1980 136  40.5  62  18.6 
1990 200  48.3  93  22.5 
1997 204  43.5  89  19.0 
1999 211  43.8  89  18.5 
2002 221  44.0  99  20.0 
Source:  ECLAC (2002). 
 
Overall, both in absolute and in relative terms, total poverty and extreme poverty 
worsened between 1980 and 1990.and then improved somewhat in the period before 
1997.  But  even  in the  early 1990s  the  numbers  in  poverty continued to increase 
even though there was a decline in the headcount ratio. The table also suggests that 
after 1997 there was no further progress in reducing either poverty or indigence. 
Reducing current extreme poverty rates by half toward 2015 has been defined as the 
central objective of the United Nation’s Millennium declaration. Reaching this goal 
will require a major effort for many countries in the region (UNDP, ECLAC, IPEA, 
2003). 
The region totals for the 1990s shown in table 5 hide a great deal of 
heterogeneity among the different countries (see Annex table A.4). Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and Uruguay all made significant progress in poverty 
reduction, particularly between 1990 and 1997, while Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela had large increases in poverty particularly after 1997.  Because of its 
size, Brazil’s good performance makes the performance for the region seem better 
than it for most of the other countries. Between 1990 and 1999 Brazil cut its indigent 
population by 13 million people. Indigence in the rest of Latin America rose by nine 
million. Thus for most countries observed trends in poverty followed the performance 
of the economy.  Countries in crisis after 1997 such as Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay 
and Uruguay of Mexico in 1995-96 had big increases in poverty whereas poverty fell 
rapidly in countries growing rapidly like Chile, the Dominican Republic and Mexico 
after 1996. 
The region did not manage to decrease inequality in per capita household 
income distribution during the 1990s, with the sub-continent remaining the world’s 
most unequal area (ECLAC, 2002). Measuring inequality by the Gini coefficient, the 
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available evidence shows that inequality increased further in at least 11 out of 18 
countries between 1990 and 1999 (see Annex table A.4). Two countries (Honduras 
and Uruguay) show decreasing inequality, while it is unchanged in four countries 
(Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama). 
 
4.2  Effects of export-led economic strategies on poverty and inequality 
We have seen what happened to output, employment, and earnings 
differentials in the simulations reported in section 3. What we now want to know is 
what these changes might mean for poverty and the distribution of income at the 
household level. As explained in Section 2, we do this by taking the CGE model 
simulation outcomes and applying these through the microsimulation approach as 
counterfactuals to the observed labor market parameters using the full distribution as 
given by household surveys of each country case. 
We report the comparative results of the microsimulations in two ways. First, 
the final two columns of table 4 above report the poverty and income inequality 
effects as percentage changes from the base for each of the policy simulations using 
the country-specific closures for the CGE models. Second, since the absolute changes 
in policy variables and the distribution of income differ across countries we also 
report the changes as elasticities, defined as the percentage change in poverty or 
inequality per percent change in a policy variable. To make the changes easier to 
visualize, for each policy simulation we have transferred the elasticities into four 
quadrant diagrams, and we have calculated the elasticity for both earned income and 
household income per capita (see figures 4 and 5). The diagrams put poverty on the 
vertical axis and the Gini coefficient of per capita household income on the horizontal 
axis. Thus poverty increases in the two top quadrants, and inequality increases in the 
two right hand quadrants of each diagram. 
 
4.2.1  Poverty effects of trade liberalization 
Unilateral trade liberalization reduces poverty and raising tariffs increases it. 
There is only one point-source natural resource abundant country where that is not the 
case (Ecuador) and even in this case the increase in poverty is small as a consequence 
of a unilateral tariff cut. More generally, the poverty effects are not very big. Income 
inequality at the household level rises (slightly) in most natural resource abundant 
economies as predicted (Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru), though 
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Venezuela provides an exception to this rule. The small effects on poverty and 
inequality should not be surprising, as under this scenario we are cutting tariffs further 
from already low, post-reform levels. A key conclusion is though, that pre-reform 
counterfactual (raising tariffs) would enhance poverty suggesting that trade 
liberalization is indeed poverty-reducing. These results are broadly consistent with 
moving to completely free trade under the WTO or to a region-wide multilateral trade 
agreement under FTAA. Both of these changes also reduce poverty and inequality in 
most of the countries. However, poverty rises (modestly) under these scenarios in 
Costa Rica (only WTO), Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela, mainly due to the 
negative effects on the agricultural sectors in these countries which is not sufficiently 
picked up with employment and income growth in other sectors. 
Across-the-board increases in export subsidies are generally poverty reducing 
as well (in apparent contradiction with the WTO scenario), with a few exceptions. 
Under this scenario export production is stimulated in a broad sense and given the 
small-economy assumption is assumed not to affect world prices. In this sense it 
works alike a tariff cut stimulating aggregate employment as mostly more labor-
intensive (e.g. agriculture) sectors benefit from subsidies that are increased in the 
scenario. 
These results have to be interpreted with some caution though. These are 
general equilibrium, comparative static results that do not take into account the costs 
of adjusting to a changed production structure. If the exchange rate is fixed, the 
simulation determines the impact of lowering the tariff rates and bringing in more 
foreign capital to permanently finance a bigger balance of payments deficit.  In the 
previous section we saw that this change is expansionary (though growth is led by 
non-traded goods rather than exports).  If foreign saving is fixed, the exchange rate 
has to depreciate to allow exports to expand enough to pay for additional imports.  
But total output and employment increase in both cases and poverty declines. The 
simulation results also suggest that if no poverty reduction was observed in practice 
after trade liberalization, it is either because a lot of other poverty-increasing factors 
were changing at the same time (most typically dealing with macro shocks; see Taylor 
and Vos 2002) or because the economies are still in the process of adapting their 
production structures. 
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4.2.2  Poverty and external balance shifts 
As we saw in the previous section devaluation is contractionary and an 
increase in foreign saving is expansionary. These changes have the expected effects 
on poverty.  Devaluation increases poverty, in some cases by quite large amounts and 
foreign saving reduces it. It is also clear that devaluation increases income inequality.  
Curiously enough however it does not increase earnings inequality. That suggests that 
traded goods are in most countries are not skill intensive. Thus while total output and 
employment go down with devaluation (or a fall in foreign saving), for those who 
keep their jobs skill-intensity falls.   
 
4.2.3 Productivity  increases 
Far and away the largest amount of poverty reduction comes from increasing 
productivity. That is true whether the change is measured in absolute amounts or in 
elasticities. In most cases increasing productivity also reduces inequality. This quite 
clearly underlines the obvious and important role that economic growth plays in 
poverty reduction. 
 
4.3  Labor market adjustment and poverty impact 
As explained above, the study assumed that the labor markets are the main 
transmission channel of the impact of trade reforms on poverty and distribution. The 
effect of alteration of parameters of the labor market structure on poverty and 
inequality was analyzed in the country cases and is summarized in Annex Table A.5. 
This table indicates, for each country, the labor market parameter which shows the 
largest change, in absolute terms, when explaining total changes in poverty and 
inequality for different simulations. The following stylized facts can be observed: 
•  Mean wage (and other labor-earnings) adjustments (W1 as defined in section 
2.4) tend to have the largest effect on the poverty incidence in most simula-
tions. 
•  Changes in the remuneration structure (W2) are also the most important vari-
able explaining absolute changes in income inequality at the household level 
(rather than quantity shifts in the employment structure or reductions in unem-
ployment) in most country cases. Unsurprisingly, this also applies to the simu-
lated effects on the Gini coefficient of labor income inequality for the full dis-
tribution. 
•  Quantity adjustment in the form of a falling rate of unemployment are key in 
explaining poverty reduction under trade liberalization in a few cases, most 
notoriously Brazil and Peru, as well as in Cuba and Venezuela in the FTAA 
scenario. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this project was to determine the impact of trade liberalization, 
external shocks and domestic policy responses on output, employment, poverty and 
the distribution of income. We found that trade liberalization increased output in 
almost every country in our sample. It also increased either wages or employment 
depending on the closure used in the country-specific models. Consistent with this, 
poverty declined in all but one country in the unilateral trade liberalization scenario. 
Rising labor inequality, particularly between skilled and unskilled workers, emerges 
in the larger number of cases, but does not necessarily translate into more inequality 
in per capita household incomes because of offsetting positive employment 
effects.These results are very different from the historical experience of most Latin 
American countries in the period after trade liberalization. This is partly due to the 
many other disturbances that affected the region during the period and partly because 
ours are comparative static equilibrium results that say nothing at all about the 
adjustment period during which the economy adjusts to changes in tariff protection.   
Two alternative trade liberalization scenarios, WTO and FTAA have exactly 
the same positive effects on output, employment and poverty as a uniform and 
unilateral tariff reduction case in most countries.  
In contrast, devaluation as an isolated policy measure is contractionary 
according to our results.  It causes a decline in output and employment almost 
everywhere and an increase in poverty.  The opposite is true for an increase in foreign 
borrowing.  In both cases the simulation assumes a permanent change in the exchange 
rate or the inflow of foreign saving which is very different than the short run effect of 
devaluation on an economy out of equilibrium and in either a recession or a balance of 
payments crisis. The model results also do not consider likely negative effects of 
increased debt servicing following an increase in foreign borrowing neither do they 
take account of the possibility of emerging debt-solvency constraints. 
Subsidizing exports is expansionary in all but Brazil and Argentina (for the 
fixed exchange rate closure). Employment increases and poverty declines in most 
cases.  Skill-differentials however rise in some countries and fall in others. Thus one 
cannot say that choosing a more export-led growth strategy will in general favor either 
the skilled or the unskilled. This depends on the export structure of individual 
countries. 
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In terms of results on poverty, the analysis confirms the main results of the 
macro CGE simulations showed under section 3. Policy measures with contractionary 
effects on the level of economic activity have negative results on poverty, leading to 
increased poverty incidence in most of the countries. This is the case for nominal 
devaluation and increase in tariffs. On the other hand, tariff reductions, productivity 
increases, and trade and integration agreements in line with FTAA and WTO have 
positive effects on the level of economic activity and contribute to reduce the poverty 
incidence in a majority of the countries. 
If labor market parameters are crucial to explain poverty and inequality 
variations, and most of the evidence point in that direction, wages levels and relative 
wage structures seem to explain most of the variations in those welfare outcomes. 
Aggregate employment changes as a consequence of trade reforms are mostly not big 
enough to exercise a significant impact on poverty and inequality. 
In sum, export-led economic strategies have not been the panacea for welfare 
improvements, in the form of poverty and inequality reduction, many of its supporters 
expected when advocating these policy choices. But they have not been the devil its 
detractors predicted either. To reduce poverty and inequality from the severe levels 
most of the countries of the region are showing at the beginning of the new century 
may require policy mixes far more complicated and tailored to country specificities 
than the Washington medicine predicted a decade ago. 
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FIGURE 4 
Poverty and inequality responses to CGE simulations – Domestic Policy Scenarios 
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FIGURE 5 
Poverty and inequality responses to CGE simulations – FTAA and WTO scenarios 
(percentage changes with respect to indicated policy scenario) 
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APPENDICES 
TABLE A.1 
Mathematical summary statement for the standard CGE Model 
SETS 
Symbol  Explanation Symbol  Explanation
aA ∈   activities  () cC M N C ∈ ⊂   commodities not in CM 
( ) aA C E S A ∈⊂ activities with a CES function at 
the top of the technology nest 
() cC T C ∈ ⊂   transaction service 
commodities 
( ) aA L E O A ∈⊂ activities with a Leontief function 
at the top of the technology nest 
() cC X C ∈ ⊂   commodities with domestic 
production  
cC ∈   commodities  fF ∈   factors 
( cC D C ∈⊂ )   commodities with domestic sales 
of domestic output  iI N S ∈   institutions (domestic and rest 
of world) 
( cC D N C ∈⊂ )   commodities not in CD  () i INSD INS ∈ ⊂   domestic institutions 
() cC E C ∈⊂   exported commodities   ( i INSDNG INSD) ∈ ⊂ domestic non-government 
institutions 
( cC E N C ∈⊂ ) ) commodities not in CE  ( hH I N S D N G ∈ ⊂   households 
( cC M C ∈⊂ )   imported commodities     
PARAMETERS 
c cwts   weight of commodity c in the CPI  c qg   base-year quantity of 
government demand 
c dwts   weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index  c qinv  
base-year quantity of private 
investment demand 
ca ica   quantity of c as intermediate 
input per unit of activity a  if shif   share for domestic institution i 
in income of factor f 
' cc icd   quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per unit of c’ produced and  ' ii shii   share of net income of i’ to i (i’ 
∈ INSDNG’; i ∈ INSDNG)
' cc ice   quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per exported unit of c’  a ta   tax rate for activity a 
' cc icm   quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per imported unit of c’   c te   export tax rate 
a inta   quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity  f tf   direct tax rate for factor f 
a iva   quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity  i tins  
exogenous direct tax rate for 
domestic institution i 
i mps  
base savings rate for domestic 
institution i  i tins01   0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
i mps01   0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially flexed  c tm   import tariff rate 
c pwe   export price (foreign currency)  c tq    rate of sales tax 
c pwm   import price (foreign currency)    if trnsfr   transfer from factor f to 
institution i 
c qdst   quantity of stock change  a tva   rate of value-added tax for 
activity a 
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TABLE A.1 (continued)  
Greek Letters    
a
a α   efficiency parameter in the CES activity 
function 
t
c δ   CET function share parameter 
va
a α   efficiency parameter in the CES value-
added function 
va
fa δ   CES value-added function share 
parameter for factor f in activity a 
ac
c α   shift parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
m
ch γ   subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
q
c α   Armington function shift parameter 
h
ach γ  
subsistence consumption of home 
commodity c from activity a for 
household h 
t
c α   CET function shift parameter  ac θ   yield of output c per unit of activity a 
h
ach β  
marginal share of consumption spending 
on home commodity c from activity a for 
household h 
a
a ρ        CES production function exponent 
m
ch β   marginal share of consumption spending 
on marketed commodity c for household h 
va
a ρ   CES value-added function exponent 
a
a δ   CES activity function share parameter 
ac
c ρ   domestic commodity aggregation 
function exponent 
ac
ac δ   share parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
q
c ρ   Armington function exponent 
q
c δ   Armington function share parameter 
t
c ρ   CET function exponent 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
CPI   consumer price index   MPSADJ  
savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for 
base) 
DTINS change in domestic institution tax share  
(= 0 for base; exogenous variable)  f QFS   quantity supplied of factor 
FSAV   foreign savings (FCU)  TINSADJ  
direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
GADJ  
government consumption adjustment 
factor  fa WFDIST  
wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
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TABLE A.1 (continued) 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
DMPS  
change in domestic institution savings 
rates (= 0 for base; exogenous variable)  fa QF   quantity demanded of factor f from 
activity a 
DPI  
producer price index for domestically 
marketed output  c QG   government consumption demand for 
commodity 
EG   government expenditures  ch QH   quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h 
h EH   consumption spending for household  ach QHA  
quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c from 
activity a for household h 
EXR  exchange rate (LCU  per unit of FCU)  a QINTA   quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input 
GOVSHR  
government consumption share in 
nominal absorption  ca QINT   quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity a 
GSAV   government savings  c QINV   quantity of investment demand for 
commodity 
INVSHR   investment share in nominal absorption  c QM   quantity of imports of commodity 
i MPS  
marginal propensity to save for domestic 
non-government institution (exogenous 
variable) 
c QQ   quantity of goods supplied to 
domestic market (composite supply) 
a PA   activity price (unit gross revenue)  c QT    quantity of commodity demanded as 
trade input 
c PDD   demand price for commodity produced 
and sold domestically  a QVA   quantity of (aggregate) value-added 
c PDS   supply price for commodity produced 
and sold domestically  c QX   aggregated quantity of domestic 
output of commodity 
c PE   export price (domestic currency)  ac QXAC    quantity of output of commodity c 
from activity a 
a PINTA   aggregate intermediate input price for 
activity a  TABS   total nominal absorption 
c PM   import price (domestic currency)  i TINS   direct tax rate for institution i (i ∈ 
INSDNG) 
c PQ   composite commodity price  ' ii TRII   transfers from institution i’ to i (both 
in the set INSDNG) 
a PVA   value-added price (factor income per unit 
of activity)    
c PX   aggregate producer price for commodity  f WF   average price of factor 
ac PXAC   producer price of commodity c for 
activity a  f YF   income of factor f 
a QA   quantity (level) of activity  YG   government revenue 
c QD   quantity sold domestically of domestic 
output  i YI   income of domestic non-government 
institution 
c QE   quantity of exports  if YIF   income to domestic institution i from 
factor f 
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TABLE A.1 (continued)  
EQUATIONS 
# Equation Domain Description
Price Block 




1 cc c c
cC T
import import tariff exchange rate cost of trade
price price adjust LCUper inputs per
LCU FCU ment FCU import unit
PM pwm tm EXR PQ icm
∈
−
=⋅ + ⋅+ ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
=⋅⋅ + ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
c c ∑
 
cC M ∈   Import Price 




1 cc c c
cC T
export export tariff exchange rate cost of trade
price price adjust LCU per inputs per
LCU FCU ment FCU export unit
PE pwe te EXR PQ ice
∈
−
=⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
=⋅⋅ − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
c c ∑
 













PDD PDS PQ icd
∈
=+ ⋅



















1 cc c c c c
absorption




domestic sales quantity import quantity
sales tax
PQ tq QQ PDD QD PM QM ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅







  Absorption 
5 
cc cc cc
producer price domestic supply price export price
times marketed times times
output quantity domestic sales quantity export quantity
PX QX PDS QD PE QE ⋅= ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡
=+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢





























aggregate  intermediate input cost
intermediate per unit of aggregate







⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎣⎦ ⎣
∑
 
aA ∈   Aggregate 
intermediate 
input price 
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net of taxes pricetimes
input pricetimes
times activity level quantity
quantity
PA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ =+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 





















Producer price index  prices times
























aa a a a a
activity quantity of aggregate value added
level quantity aggregateintermediateinput CES
QA  QVA QINTA
ρρ ρ αδ δ
−− =⋅⋅ + −⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 






















QVA PINTA  =









⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 
































demand for aggregate  activity 





⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎣⎦ ⎣
 

















aa f af a
fF
quantity of aggregate factor

























fa f a a a fa fa fa fa
fF
marginal cost of marginal revenue product
factor f in activity a of factor f in activity a







⋅= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑
aA ∈  
fF ∈  
Factor 
demand 
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intermediate demand  aggregate intermediate 
for commodity c  input quantity 











aA ∈  












of commodity c  of commodity c 
of commodity c 
from activity a from activity a
from activity a
QXAC QHA QA θ
∈
+= ⋅






aA ∈  














production of production of


































c a c c a ca c a ca c
aA
marginal cost of com- marginal revenue product of
modity c from activity a commodity c from activity a





⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤















c cc tt t
cc c cc
aggregate marketed export quantity, domestic
domestic output sales of domestic output CET
 =   + (1- ) QX QE QD
=
ρ ρρ αδ δ ⋅⋅ ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡



















supply ratio price ratio
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sales of  domestic exports  for 
marketed
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composite import quantity, domestic
supply use of domestic output




ρ αδ δ ⋅⋅ ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 















demand ratio price ratio
QM PDD  =























composite marketed domestic imports  for 
supply output for  c CM CDN)]
cC D C M N ) ]










'' ' ' ' '
''
cc c cc c cc cc
cC
demand for sum of demands
transactions for imports, exports, 
services and domestic sales




































sum of activity payments








⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑ a
 
fF ∈   Factor Income 
29  ( ) 1 if if f f r o w  f
income of  share of income income of  factor f
institution i  of factor f to (net of tax and 
from factor f institution i transfer to RoW)
YIF  = shif tf YF trnsfr EXR
=
⎡⎤ ⋅− ⋅ − ⋅ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡
⋅ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢





iI N S D ∈  






ii f i i i g o v i r o w
fF iI N S D N G
transfers
transfers 
income of  factor from other domestic
from
institution i income non-government
governmen
institutions
YI  =  YIF TRII trnsfr CPI trnsfr EXR
=+ +
∈∈
++ ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥









⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
iI N S D N G
 





'' ' ' ' ii ii i i i
share of net income  income of institution
transfer from
of institution i'  i', net of savings and
institution i' to i
transfered to i  direct taxes
TRII  = shii (1-MPS ) (1-TINS ) YI
=
⋅⋅⋅





iI N S D N G ∈  
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TABLE A.1 (continued)  
h h
32 
() 11 hi h h
iI N S D N G
household income  household income, net of direct 
disposable for  taxes, savings, and transfers to 
consumption other non-government institutions






















ch h c c h ac ac h
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ach h c c h ac ac h
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demand for base-year government
commodity c consumption
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iI N S D N G fF aA
a ac c ac c c
aA c C M c C E







YG TINS YI tf YF tva PVA QVA
ta tm EXR te EXR QA pwm QM pwe QE PA
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⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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TABLE A.1 (continued)  
38 
cc i g o v



















demand for supply of









fF ∈   Factor market 
40 
cc a c h c
aA hH
cc c
composite intermediate household government
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TABLE A.1 (continued)  
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TABLE A.2  
Closure rules for standardized and country-specific CGE simulations 
 Argentina Bolivia  Cuba Brazil  Chile  Colombia Costa Rica   Ecuador   Peru     Dom. 
Rep  Uruguay Venezuela
Standardized closure rules 
External Balance  1 and 2  1 and 2 1 and 2 2  1 and 2 1 and 2  1 and 2  1 and 2  1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2  1 and 2 
Government Balance  1                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Savings-Investment  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Factor Markets 
Labor market  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Capital  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Country-specific closure rules 
External Balance  3  1  2  2*  1  2  2  2  1  1  2  1 
Government Balance  4  1  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  2 
Savings-Investment                       
                    
                   
                     
2 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1
Factor  Markets
Labor market 
 formal - skilled  3  3  3  3  3  1  3  1  3  1  1  5 
 informal - skilled  3  1  5  3  3  1  3  1  3  1  1  5 
 formal - unskilled  3  3  5  3  3  1  3  3  3  3  1  5 
 informal - unskilled  3  1  5  3  3  1  3  3  3  3  1  5 
Capital  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
Note: * Cuba has dual foreign exchange market with fixed official ER and flexible informal market rate. 
Definition of closures 
Value for savings-investment closure 
1 investment-driven savings (uniform mps rate point change for selected institutions) 
2 investment-driven savings (scaled mps for for selected institutions) 
3 investment is savings-driven 
4 balanced closure (1): investment and government are fixed (absolute shares) 
5 balanced closure (2): investment is fixed (abs share);  scaled mps (cf. 2) 
(mps = marginal propensity to save) 
Value for Rest of World closure 
1 Flexible ER, fixed foreign savings 
2 Fixed ER, endogenous foreign savings 
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3 Fixed ER and fixed FORSAV (Argentina: has flexible money supply and CPI) 
Value for Government closure 
1 Gov savings are flexible, dir tax rate is fixed 
2 Gov savings are fixed, uniform dir tax rate point change for selected instit. 
3 Gov savings are fixed, scaled dir tax rate for selected institutions 
Factor market closures 
1 Factors are fully employed & mobile in sim 
2 Factors are fully employed & activity-specific in sim 
3 Factors are unemployed & mobile in sim 
5 OTHER closure: 
ARG: Labor is unemployed and mobile.  For each activity, the real wage is fixed. 
QFS and nominal wage are market-clearing variables for unified labor market.  WFDIST clears each sector. 
BRA: Wage curve for most urban workers (imperfect wage adjustment) 
MEX Skilled labor: fixed wage, flex WFDIST, mobile in sim, fixed labor supply 
Unskilled labor: faces upwards sloping labor supply function; market-clearing wage, total stock endogenous, mobile among sectors. 
Agricultural labor: fully employed and mobile within agric sectors 
VEN Fixed nominal wage for all workers, real wages and unemployment adjust to balance labour supply and demand. 
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TABLE A.3   
GTAP model: simulated world market prices for FTAA and WTO scenarios 
(indices; changes from baseline) 
  FTAA WTO 
Rice 1.013  1.149 
Wheat 1.001  1.231 
Other cereals  1.002  1.204 
Fruits and vegetables  1.005  1.052 
Oil seeds  1.000  1.113 
Sugar 1.009  1.106 
Natural fibres  0.998  1.011 
Other crops  1.002  1.015 
Wool 0.995  1.066 
Forestry 0.996  1.001 
Fishing 0.996  1.016 
Meat and meat products (bovine)  1.009  1.213 
Other meat products  1.002  1.190 
Vegetable oils  1.000  1.044 
Dairy products  1.007  1.262 
Other food products  1.002  1.068 
Beverages and tobacco  1.000  1.087 
Energy products  0.997  0.980 
Mining products  0.995  0.998 
Textiles 0.998  1.014 
Clothing 0.997  0.993 
Leather products  0.997  0.992 
Paper and printing  0.998  1.010 
Oil products  0.997  0.996 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  0.998  1.013 
Mineral products  0.997  1.012 
Automobiles and parts  0.999  1.013 
Other transport equipment  0.997  1.002 
Electronic equipment  0.997  1.000 
Machinery 0.997  1.007 
Source: Simulation results of the GTAP model, prepared by E. Diaz 
Bonilla and X. Diao. 
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TABLE A.4 
Poverty and inequality indicators for Latin America during the 1990s 







 ARGENTINA               
   1990  b/  21.2  5.2  0.501 
   1997  b/  17.8  4.8  0.530 
   1999  b/  19.7  4.8  0.542 
   2001  *  31.3  10.9  - 
 BOLIVIA           
   1989  c/  53.1  23.2  0.538 
   1997    62.1  37.2  0.595 
   1999    60.6  36.5  0.586 
   2001  *  61.2 37.3  - 
 BRAZIL           
   1990    48.0  23.4  0.627 
   1996    35.8  13.9  0.638 
   1999    37.5  12.9  0.640 
   2001  *  36.9 13.0  - 
 CHILE           
   1990    38.6  12.9  0.554 
   1996    23.2  5.7  0.553 
   2000    20.6  5.7  0.559 
   2001  *  20.0 5.4  - 
 COLOMBIA           
   1991    56.1  26.1  0.531 
   1997    50.9  23.5  0.569 
   1999    54.9  26.8  0.572 
   2001  *  54.9 27.6  - 
 COSTA RICA           
   1990    26.2  9.8  0.438 
   1997    22.5  7.8  0.450 
   1999    20.3  7.8  0.473 
   2001  *  21.7 8.3  - 
 ECUADOR           
   1990  d/  62.1  26.2  0.461 
   1997  d/  56.2  22.2  0.469 
   1999  d/  63.6  31.3  0.521 
   2001  *  63.5 28.9  - 
 EL SALVADOR           
   1995    54.2  21.7  0.507 
   1997    55.5  23.3  0.510 
   1999    49.8  21.9  0.518 
   2001  *  49.9 22.5  - 
 GUATEMALA           
   1989    69.1  41.8  0.582 
   1998    60.5  34.1  0.582 
   2001  *  60.4 34.4  - 
 HONDURAS           
   1990    80.5  60.6  0.615 
   1997    79.1  54.4  0.558 
   1999    79.7  56.8  0.564 
   2001  *  79.1 56.0  - 
 MEXICO           
   1989    47.8  18.8  0.536 
   1996    52.1  21.3  0.526 
   2000    41.1  15.2  0.542 
   2001  *  42.3 16.4  - 
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  NICARAGUA           
 1993    73.6  48.4  0.582 
 1998    69.9  44.6  0.584 
   2001  *  67.4 41.5  - 
 PANAMA           
   1991    42.8  19.2  0.560 
   1997    33.2  13.0  0.570 
   1999    30.2 10.7  0.557 
   2001  *  30.8 11.6  - 
 PARAGUAY           
   1990  e/  42.2  12.7  0.447 
   1996  d/  46.3  16.3  0.493 
   1999    60.6  33.9  0.565 
   2001  *  61.8 36.1  - 
 PERU           
   1997    47.6  25.1  0.532 
   1999    48.6  22.4  0.545 
   2001  *  49.0 23.2  - 
 DOMINICAN REP.           
   1997    37.2  14.4  0.517 
   2001  *  29.2 10.9  - 
 URUGUAY           
   1990  d/  17.8  3.4  0.492 
   1997  d/  9.5  1.7  0.430 
   1999  d/  9.4  1.8  0.440 
   2001  *  12.5 2.8  - 
 VENEZUELA           
   1990    40.0  14.6  0.471 
   1997    48.1  20.5  0.507 
   1999    49.4  21.7  0.498 
   2001  *  48.5 21.2  - 
 Source: ECLAC (2002) 
 * Estimates based on microsimulations keeping the Gini coefficient constant. 
 a/ Estimate for per capita household incomes. 
 b/ Gran Buenos Aires. 
 c/ Eight largest cities and El Alto. 
 d/ Total urban 
 e/ Metropolitan area of Asunción. 
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TABLE A.5 
 Microsimulations: Main labor market adjustment impact on poverty and inequality 
  
  
Nominal devaluation  Foreign Savings Increase  Export Subsidy Increase     
                       
Productivity Shock
Poverty  Gini Gini Poverty Gini Gini Poverty Gini Gini Poverty Gini Gini




Income  Incidence           
                        
p.c.  income
Labor 
Income  Incidence p.c.  income
Labor 
Income  Incidence p.c.  income
Labor 
Income 
Argentina 6 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5
Bolivia                        
                          
                         
                         
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                          
                        
                        
                          
2 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4
Brazil * 2 2 6 n.c. n.c. n.c. 6 2 6 6 2 6
Colombia * 6 6 2 6 6 2 6 6 2 6 6 2
Costa  Rica 3 3 3 3 6a 6a 3 3 3 3 3 6a
Cuba                             
Chile 4 7 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 3 3
Ecuador 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
El  Salvador 3 3 3 4 7 4 3 3 4 4 3 3
Honduras 5 4 4 6 4 7 6 4 7 5 6 4
Mexico 6 5 5 6 3 5 6 5 5 6 6 5
Paraguay 3 3 6 4 4 6 4 4 4 2 2 4
Peru 2 2 4 5 2 3 2 2 4
Dominican  Republic 6 3 3 2 2 2 6 5 2 2 2 5
Uruguay 6 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 7 6 5 5
Venezuela * 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 2 2
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TABLE A.5 (continued) 
  Tariff Cut  FTAA Scenario  WTO scenario 














Argentina  5  5 5  6  5 5  6  5 5 
Bolivia  2  4 4  2  4 4  2  4 4 
Brazil  *  2  2 2  6  2 6  6  2 6 
Colombia  *  6  6 2  6  6 2  6  6 2 
Costa  Rica  3 3 6a  3 3 6a  3 3 6a 
Cuba  5  5 5  2  2 2  5  5 5 
Chile  6  3 3  6  7 3  6  3 3 
Ecuador  5  5 5  5  5 5  5  5 5 
El  Salvador  3  3 3  7  3 3  3  3 4 
Honduras  6  4 7  6  4 7  6  4 7 
Mexico  5  5 5  5  5 5  5  5 5 
Paraguay  4  4 4  4  3 6  3  4 3 
Peru  2  2 2  2  2 3  2  2 3 
Dominican  Republic  6  5 5  6  5 5  2  2 3 
Uruguay 6  n.c.  n.c.  6  5  5  6  5  5 
Venezuela  *  6  2 2  2  6 6  2  2 2 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Notes:  
Phase Symbol  Definition 
1 P Participation  rate 
2 U Unemployment  rate 
3  S1  Employment structure by sectors 
4  O  Employment by occupational category 
5 W1  Remuneration  structure 
6  W2  Change in mean remuneration level 
6a  W1+W2  Combined effect of W1 and W2 
7  M  Employment structure by education level 
  *  Only two phases simulated (U + W2) 
  n.c.  No change from baseline 
 
 
  63